Co-Opted? Exploratory Research on Canadian Resource 'Imperialism' in Postcolonial Tanzania by Rubara, Evans
1 | P a g e :  E R u b a r a _ M E S :  M R P _ C o - O p t e d .  © 2 0 1 4  
 
 
 
Co-Opted?  
Exploratory Research on Canadian Resource 
‘Imperialism’ in Postcolonial Tanzania 
 
Evans Rubara (YU # 212-036-885) 
Supervisor: Dr. Anna Zalik 
Submitted on: July 31, 2014 
 
A Major Paper submitted to the Faculty of Environmental Studies (FES) in partial 
fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master in Environmental Studies 
York University, Toronto – Ontario, Canada 
 
Signatures: 
 
Evans Rubara:  ______________________ 
 
Professor Anna Zalik: ______________________ 
 
2 | P a g e :  E R u b a r a _ M E S :  M R P _ C o - O p t e d .  © 2 0 1 4  
 
 
 
 
Dedication 
To Maggie and Danny, my precious gifts, and to the children  
I have encountered in the mining areas since I started my Social Justice journey. You are the 
inspiration that has kept me on this challenging journey, filling my heart with joy and the 
hope that justice will eventually be attained in the land of the living. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 | P a g e :  E R u b a r a _ M E S :  M R P _ C o - O p t e d .  © 2 0 1 4  
 
Acknowledgements  
First and Foremost, I acknowledge and thank the Creator of Heaven and earth in whom 
“…we live and move and have our being” (Acts 17: 28).  
I want to convey many thanks to the Tanzania Mining Education Study Group (TSMEG) 
committee at Trinity St. Paul’s (TSP), the United Church of Canada (UCC), Mining Watch 
Canada (MWC), and Kairos Canada for both moral and material support.  You have done more 
than a professional networking relationship deserves. You have been my family home away from 
home.  
As well, I want to thank the Faculty of Environmental Studies (FES) and the Centre for 
Refugee Studies (CRS) for making it possible for me to begin to realise my dream in the 
academic world. Special thanks to Dr. Anna Zalik, Dr. Ellie Perkins and Dr. Felipe Montoya-
Greenheck at FES, and Dr. Susan McGrath and Michele Millard for your trust, confidence, 
patience, insights, and encouragements throughout my studies. I would also like to thank Staff at 
the Office of Student and Academic Services (OSAS) at York University who spent their time 
working with me to find a way to accommodate so many of my logistical needs. The world needs 
more people like you.  This work has been done in a language not close to where I come from. I 
want to take this opportunity to thank Jeanne Moffatt, Sarah Gayman and Terry Smith for proof 
reading my work. 
Special thanks to Sarah Mshana for taking up the responsibility of raising our children 
during my study period besides her other responsibilities. Finally, my most special Thank You 
go to my children, Maggie and Danny for being so patient while away, accommodating and 
supportive of my studies. These last two years have been the most difficult for us, yet the 
sweetest knowing how blessed I am to have you in my life. You have taught me to be a friend, a 
father and above all, to accept being the object of your unconditional love. You are gems beyond 
any price in this world. Now that I have received much, it is time to give back.  
“For everyone to whom much is given […] much will be required” (Luke 12: 48). 
To all, THANK YOU! 
4 | P a g e :  E R u b a r a _ M E S :  M R P _ C o - O p t e d .  © 2 0 1 4  
 
Contents  
Acronyms ........................................................................................................................................ 6 
Abstract ........................................................................................................................................... 9 
Foreword ....................................................................................................................................... 10 
Research Limitations ................................................................................................................. 12 
Chapter 1: Introduction: Historical & Social Context of Contemporary Multinational Mining 
Corporations in Tanzania .............................................................................................................. 13 
Context and Hypothesis ............................................................................................................. 13 
The United Republic of Tanzania (URT)................................................................................... 15 
Geological Environments of Tanzania ...................................................................................... 18 
Mining Activities in the Precolonial Tanzania .......................................................................... 19 
Mining Activities in the Colonial Tanzania............................................................................... 22 
The Building Blocks of Imperialistic Legacy ............................................................................ 24 
Methodology .............................................................................................................................. 30 
Organisation of the Major Paper .............................................................................................. 31 
Chapter 2: Conceptual Framework: The Making of ‘African’ Leaders....................................... 32 
The evolution of ‘African’ Leadership and Governance Structures ......................................... 32 
African Leadership and Governance in the Liberation Movement ........................................... 35 
The Characteristics of the State Apparatus within the Tanzanian Context .............................. 36 
The Tanzanian Government: Accountability and Structural Allegiances ................................. 38 
Chapter 3: Cultural Structures and the Dynamics in State Decision-making Processes ............. 41 
The Role of Kinship and Ethnicity in the Tanzanian Politics ................................................... 42 
Of Nepotism and Distributive Justice........................................................................................ 46 
Popular Theories regarding the Underdevelopment of African States ..................................... 47 
Chapter 5: The Canadian State and Its Contemporary ‘Trade’ Relations with Tanzania ............ 49 
Characteristics of Trade Relations between Tanzania and Canada ......................................... 50 
The Tanzania-Canada Relations Impact on Microeconomics .................................................. 52 
The ‘Machiavellian’ Economic Partnership in Canada-Tanzania Relations ........................... 54 
Canadian MMCs’ ‘Parasitic’ Business Trends in Tanzania .................................................... 60 
Chapter 5: The Neoliberal ‘Pomposity’ & Its Realities in Tanzania ........................................... 62 
Rural Communities and Mining Activities in Tanzania ............................................................ 62 
5 | P a g e :  E R u b a r a _ M E S :  M R P _ C o - O p t e d .  © 2 0 1 4  
 
Canadian MMCs in Tanzania: Socio-environmental Impacts (Kahama and North Mara) ..... 66 
Environmental and Water Pollution: Impacts on Humans and Livestock ................................ 71 
Mineral Development Induced Displacements (MDIDs) .......................................................... 74 
Challenges of Relocation and Compensation in the Tanzanian Context .................................. 76 
Mineral-based Economics and Rural-Urban Migration Trends in Tanzania .......................... 78 
Political Competition and Social Services ................................................................................ 80 
Chapter 6: Conclusion and Discussion: Co-Opted? Challenges of Synthesised Governance 
Structures in Tanzania................................................................................................................... 82 
Mining Communities, Conflicts and Redress ............................................................................ 84 
The State of ‘Indifference’ and Tanzania’s Mining Sector ....................................................... 88 
Value and Contribution of the Major Paper ............................................................................. 89 
Bibliography ................................................................................................................................. 92 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 | P a g e :  E R u b a r a _ M E S :  M R P _ C o - O p t e d .  © 2 0 1 4  
 
Acronyms 
µg/l  Micrograms per litre 
ABG:   African Barrick Gold  
AFGEM: Africa Gem Resources  
AGA:  AngloGold Ashanti 
AU:  African Union 
BAKWATA: Baraza Kuu la Waislamu Tanzania (The National Muslim Council of Tanzania) 
BCR:  Bomani Commission Report  
BGC:  Barrick Gold Corporation 
CCM:  Chama cha Mapinduzi (The Revolutionary Party
1
) 
CCT:  Christian Council of Tanzania 
CEO:  Chief Executive Officer 
CESCR: International Covenant on Economics, Social and Cultural Rights 
CODESRIA: Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa 
CRC:  Constitutional Review Commission 
CRS:  Centre for Refugee Studies  
CSOs:  Civil Society Organisations 
DFI(s):  Foreign Direct Investment(s) 
DID:  Development induced displacements 
EAC:  East African Community 
ECA:  Economic Commission for Africa 
ECOSOC: Economic and Social Council 
EEC:  European Economic Community 
EI:  Extractive Industries 
ERP:  Economic Recovery Program 
ES:  Environmental Assessment 
ESRF:  Economic and Social Research Foundation 
FBO(s): Faith Based Organisation(s) 
FES:  Faculty of Environmental Studies  
FIPA:  Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement  
FRELIMO : Frente de Libertacao de Mocambique (Mozambican Independence Front) 
GATT:  General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade  
GDP:  Gross Domestic Production 
GGM:  Geita Gold Mine 
GGM:  Geita Gold Mine 
GoC:  Government of Canada 
GST:  Geological Survey of Tanzania, The  
HIPC:  Highly Indebted Poor Countries 
ICFTU:  International Confederation of Free Trade Unions 
ICMM:  International Council on Mining and Metals 
IDMC:  Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 
IDPs:  Internally Displaced Persons 
                                                          
1
 Could also be rendered as ‘Party of the Revolution’  
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Abstract 
Since the mid-1980s and the emergence of the structural adjustment policies (SAPs) and 
the Washington Consensus
3
 (WC) in Tanzania, there have been changes in the scope of State 
sovereignty in Tanzania as elsewhere in the Global South. The limitations of State sovereignty 
have been particularly apparent vis-à-vis the mining sector. The Tanzanian government has 
shown visible trends that suggest ‘it is operating under considerable pressure’ from external 
forces as it responds more to the Canadian corporate interests. 
Employing Marxist theoretical framework, and theoretically relying on the earlier works 
of  Marx & Engels (1848/1968), Miliband (1969), Fanon (1963/2004), Rodney (1972/1981), 
Harvey (2005) and Poulantzas (1980) etc., this Major Paper presents empirical exploratory 
research on the ‘imperialistic’ elements of mineral-based trade relations between Tanzania, 
Canada and Canadian multinational mining corporations (MMCs) operating in Tanzania.  
It explores the historical colonial as well as cultural/ethnic leadership and governance 
structures which could factor in the contemporary – neoliberal trade ‘collaboration’ between the 
Tanzanian government, the Canadian government and the Canadian multinational mining 
companies (MMCs) operating in Tanzania. This research looks at the mineral-based trade 
relations between Tanzania, Canada and Canadian MMCs operating in Tanzania and highlights 
the impacts of the Canadian MMCs operations in Tanzania. The research concludes that even 
though clothed in the language of neoliberal ‘sustainable’ development discourse, the mineral-
based relations between Tanzania, Canada and Canadian MMCs embodies the tenets of 
European-dominated imperialist practices, and is fundamentally imperialistic. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
3
 The WC was a set of policy prescriptions originally written by John Williamson – former adviser to IMF, 
proposing economic recovery strategy for Latin American countries. The 10 point policy prescription was 
considered “to be desirable in just about all the countries of Latin America [this ] set of economic policies advocated 
for developing countries in general by [the IMF, World Bank], and the US Treasury” (Accessed on June 16, 2014 at: 
http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/williamson0204.pdf).  
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Foreword 
My Plan of Study (POS), whose Area of Concentration is “Natural Resources, 
Communities and ‘Sustainability’”, has three major components, namely “Globalisation and 
Development”; “Social and Environmental Justice” and “Local Communities’ Displacement by 
Development”. This Major Paper research process has helped me to achieve most of my learning 
objectives, which were to: 
i. acquire theoretical understanding of Global Justice and development issues  
ii. develop an understanding in critical development studies as relates to social and 
environmental justice work  
iii. develop an understanding of political thought embedded in social and environmental 
justice issues  
iv. acquire knowledge on different forms of displacement confronting community members 
in mineral rich areas  
v. gain an in-depth insight of the painful experiences that communities are subjected to 
during evictions and post-eviction  
vi. acquire knowledge on different forms of displacement that community members face and 
how to effectively addressed legally and socially*
4
 
vii. learn about positive/successful self-determining activities against displacement by 
resource extraction and explore applicability of these solutions to the Southern African 
context*  
This Major Paper has addressed the above POS components through theoretical and 
empirical discussion on globalisation and development discourses, as well as the impacts of 
mineral-based trade relations between Tanzania, Canada and Canadian MMCs. In its different 
sections this Major Paper looks at the “Historical and Contemporary Contexts of the 
multinational mining corporations (MMCs) in Tanzania”. This section helped in understanding 
the evolution of the Tanzanian mining/extractive sector in precolonial and colonial times and 
                                                          
4
 *Given the broad nature of my POS’ Area of Concentration and study areas of interest, it soon became evident that 
these last two learning objectives could not be addressed exhaustively within the MES programme. The last two 
learning objectives proved rather broad and required a study period dedicated at looking into the CSO programmes 
in Tanzania in comparison to those in Zambia and Costa Rica as indicated in my POS. 
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helped identify reasons as to why contemporary mining in Tanzania do not address effectively 
the social and economic needs of the people of Tanzania.  
Adopting a Marxist theoretical framework, this research analytically looks at leadership 
and governance structures within the Tanzanian context from historical liberation and 
postcolonial perspectives in “The Making of African Leaders” section.  This section was helpful 
in understanding the complexity of different relations between the State and the ruling class. As 
well, this section highlighted different leadership and governance structures at play within the 
globalisation and development discourse. As well it highlighted apparent external pressures 
experienced by actors within the Tanzanian State in pursuit to address the needs of its citizenry, 
especially those living in the mining areas.  
In looking at some of the contributing factors to the seeming apathy within the Tanzanian 
State, the chapter looking at “Cultural Structures and the Dynamics in State Decision-making 
Processes” section, helped in understanding the structural dynamics faced by the Tanzanian 
government. It was clear from this section that the Tanzania’s leadership structure as it is today 
is an attempt to espouse synthesised sociopolitical and economic systems. It would appear that 
after the demise of Ujamaa policies in 1985, Tanzania has not found a clear social and political 
framework on which to establish its social, political and economic values and practices. 
To understand the complex relationship between the MMCs’ home/host countries and the 
MMCs operators I looked at “The Canadian State and Its Contemporary ‘Trade’ Relations with 
Tanzania”.  This section was useful to understand factors which lead to the state of apathy on the 
part of the Tanzanian State apparatus. This section highlights the ‘imperialist’ characteristics of 
the ‘trade’ relationship between the two nation-states as well as the strategies by the Canadian 
government and Canadian MMCs to influence policymaking processes. This section is followed 
by a section which highlighted the pros and cons of “The Neoliberal ‘Pomposity’” and 
highlighted social, environmental and economic impacts of mineral-based trade relations 
between Tanzania, Canada and Canadian MMCs, especially in relation to the operations of 
Canadian Barrick Gold Corporation (BGC) through its African business unit (ABU) subsidiary 
African Barrick Gold (ABG) in Bulyanhulu – Kakola area, North Mara and Buzwagi mining 
areas.   
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Apart from learning and acquiring new skills, the Master in Environmental Studies 
(MES) programme, has challenged my views on why a number of African States, including 
Tanzania lag behind economically. Formerly, I was of the view that the social, economic and 
environmental woes the people of Tanzania are confronted by were a result of residual colonial 
structures. Indeed, colonialism had its impacts and residual colonial structures are still 
identifiable within Tanzania’s leadership and governance structures. But residual colonial 
leadership and governance structures cannot be absolutely blamed for mismanagement of 
resources and abuse of office by Tanzanians 50 years after independence. Besides this Major 
Paper research programme process has highlighted the dynamics confronting the civil society 
organisations (CSOs) in Tanzania including political party players. The scramble for project 
funding and the increasing need for livelihood needs are introducing a peculiar nepotistic in the 
Tanzanian social, political and economic environments. The latter has different impacts on the 
efforts by different actors for an equitable society in Tanzania. 
Research Limitations 
In the initial undertaking of this Major Paper research, I proposed a research presentation 
that was both theoretical and specific, based on Parliamentary Hansards from the Parliament of 
the United Republic of Tanzania (PURT) 1995 - 2010, group interviews in local communities in 
Bulyanhulu – Kakola area, North Mara and Buzwagi mining areas and secondary materials.  This 
was not possible as I was not able to travel to Tanzania for fieldwork due to unavoidable 
circumstances. Instead, I was able to access and utilise Parliamentary Hansards between the 
years 2008 and 2010 which were accessible online through the Parliament of the United 
Republic of Tanzania (PURT) website. This factor changed the direction of my Major Paper 
research. Therefore, this research is in most part theoretical with some empirical evidences in the 
5
th
 and 6
th
 chapters. However, the Parliamentary Hansards and secondary sources, that is to say 
reports by NGOs and News Reports have been sufficient in addressing the majority of the 
learning objectives stated on my POS.   
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Chapter 1 
Introduction: Historical & Social Context of 
Contemporary Multinational Mining Corporations in 
Tanzania 
 
Colonialism in both its forms and its substance, posited the issue of contingent human violence […] 
with the lingering doubt of the very possibility of self-government, and with the risk, which has never 
disappeared, of the continent and Africans being again consigned for a long time to a degrading 
condition. 
(Achille Mbembe 2001: 13)  
Context and Hypothesis 
Mwalimu Nyerere, the founding Father of the Tanzanian nation, stepped down from his 
Presidency in 1985 after 24 years (1961 – 1985). Since that time, Tanzania has gone through 
significant changes related to mineral sector legislations (Lange & ESRF 2006; AU/ECA 2011; 
Munganyizi 2012; URT 1997; URT 2008). Various iterations of the Tanzanian government have 
tried to formulate mineral policies which would, on one hand, attract foreign investment to the 
country and, on the other hand, ensure that its people were well provided for. 
However, the reports of success in the implementation of the neoliberal capitalist market-
led economic policies (MacDonald & Roe 2007) conflict with the deepening poverty among the 
people of Tanzania (AU/ECA 2011). The analysis of this Paper is an attempt to explore factors 
that lead to what appears to be the abandonment of the people of Tanzania by the government, 
especially the citizens living in the mineral-rich regions of the country while collaborating with 
the ‘imperialist’ Canadian MMCs.  
The expectation of citizens of a country harbouring significant deposits of mineral 
resources such as Tanzania is that such mineral resource endowment should be a means of social 
and economic wellbeing for its citizens but especially for community members in the mining 
localities and the national population in its entirety. According to the report compiled by the 
Presidential Mining Review Committee (PMRC) to advise the Government on oversight of the 
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Mining sector also known as the Bomani Commission report, until 2008 Tanzania’s confirmed 
mineral deposits as shown on the figure below: 
Mineral Type Amount  
Gold 2,222 tones 
Nickel 209 million tones 
Copper 13.65 million tones 
Iron Ore 103.0 million tones 
Diamond 50.9 million ounces 
Tanzanite 12.60 tones 
Limestone 313.0 million tones 
Soda ash 109 million tones 
Gypsum 3.0 million tones 
Phosphate 577.04 million tones 
Coal 911.0 million tones 
Figure 1: Tanzania's Confirmed Mineral Reserve. Source: URT 2008 
Despite such mineral wealth endowment the exploitation of natural resources in Tanzania 
has led to despondency among local community members due to mass expropriation of land and 
environmental pollution. According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
1980 – 2010 Human Development Index (HDI) indicators, Tanzania falls in the lower HDI 
categories with mean 0.488 and ranked at 159
5
 out of 186 countries. Besides, Tanzania is 
currently listed as one of the least developed countries (LCDs) globally with a confirmed 93 per 
cent total dependency ratio
6
 (TDR) with 90 per cent
7
 of its poverty stricken population living in 
the rural areas, which includes the mineral rich areas.  
This Major Paper questions the extent to which the Tanzanian State actors have 
internalized western capitalist values and ideologies such that they seem to turn blind eyes from 
social, economic and environmental challenges brought by foreign direct investments (FDIs) in 
the mining/extractive sector from Global North countries such as Canada.  Hence the title, “Co-
Opted?” In its pages, this Major Paper attempts to answer its main research question which asks: 
“What are the historical political, economic and social factors that lead to apparent apathy within 
the Tanzanian government, and failure to prioritize the interests of its citizenry in the mining 
areas while it appears to be more responsive to Canadian corporate interests?”  
                                                          
5
 Information accessed online on September 10, 2014 at: http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/TZA  
6
 The Least Developed Countries 2013, UNCTAD. Accessed August 29, 2014 at: 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/ldc2013_en.pdf  
7
 “Rural Poverty in the United Republic of Tanzania”. Accessed August 29, 2014 at: 
http://www.ruralpovertyportal.org/country/home/tags/tanzania  
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The United Republic of Tanzania (URT) 
The United Republic of Tanzania (URT) is one of the East African Community
8
 (EAC) 
countries bordering the Republics of Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi. Located to the 
South-East of the other EAC member countries, Tanzania declared its Sovereign State status in 
1961 from Britain, the colonial power, and became the republic of Tanganyika in 1962.
9
 In 1964 
Tanganyika became the United Republic of Tanzania after its Union with Zanzibar. Identified as 
the World’s 31st largest country10, currently Tanzania is the home of some 44,928,92311 
Tanzanians covering a total area of 945,000 km
2
.
12
 After its independence, Tanzania developed 
its own social, political and economic strategies. These were enshrined in the Arusha Declaration 
(1967). Described as a “post-independence model […] intimately tied to the rise and struggle of 
the nationalist movement in the 1950s” (Havnevik & Isinika eds. 2010: 20), the Arusha 
Declaration 1967 embodied the Ujamaa
13
 vision and policies. Ujamaa envisioned self-reliance 
and self-determination. It encompassed economic, political and cultural aspects of the Tanzanian 
society, and was aimed at setting Tanzania on a path of structural and psychological 
decolonization through localized strategies. In particular, agriculture, education and health were 
prioritized. In Mwalimu
14
 Nyerere’s own words: 
It [the Arusha Declaration] defined socialism as we understand it; it incorporated a call 
for self-reliance and it established a 'Leadership Code' which was designed to ensure that 
the Party and the Government served the people of Tanzania and not just the interests of 
the elite (Nyerere 1974: 6). 
Ujamaa’s objective was multifaceted. It was intended to counter colonial hegemony 
(Nyerere 1968; Havnevik & Isinika eds. 2010; Shivji 2012; Rodney 1972), foster power among 
the Tanzanian people, promote leadership that would work for the people and create a system 
                                                          
8
 Information accessed on July 15, 2014 at: 
http://www.eac.int/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1:welcome-to-eac&catid=34:body-text-
area&Itemid=53  
9
 Information accessed on July 15, 2014 at: http://www.tanzania.go.tz/home/pages/68  
10
 Information accessed on July 15, 2014 at: http://www.tanzania.go.tz/home/pages/219#  
11
 Information accessed on July 15, 2014 at: http://www.nbs.go.tz/  
12
 Information Accessed on July 15, 2014 at: http://www.tanzania.go.tz/home/pages/219  
13
 The transliteration of this word means Kinship but in the political context it means a country united as one 
extended family. This was a villagisation project which was established and implemented between 1967 and 1973 as 
a ‘pilot project’ for the African Socialism movement. 
14
 Teacher in KiSwahili and both a professional and endearment title Tanzanians used to address the nation’s 
founding father Julius Kambarage Nyerere. 
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that would respond to the needs of the citizenry. This was to be done through formulation of 
policies and the establishment of institutions which would effectively deliver social services on 
the one hand, and on the other hand, through the establishment of government institutions that 
would be answerable to the people of Tanzania by adherence to the national statutes enshrined in 
the constitution as well as other formulated policies and bylaws. Ujamaa sought to eliminate 
elitism and social strata within the borders of liberated Tanzania. Pioneered by Tanzania’s “first 
generation of African nationalists” (Shivji 2012: 103) under the leadership of Mwalimu 
Nyerere,
15
 Ujamaa as enshrined in the Arusha Declaration 1967. The goal was to bridge African 
“traditions [and] modern technology” (Nyerere 1968: 2). Ujamaa policies as stipulated in the 
Arusha Declaration 1967 envisaged a Tanzanian Society whose central theme is to “promote the 
dignity and the growth to excellence” (Nyerere 1968: 5) among the people of Tanzania.  
However, despite the sense of national unity achieved through the Ujamaa policies 
(Nyerere 1968; Rodney 1972; Havnevik & Isinika eds. 2010), Tanzania under the Mwalimu 
Nyerere administration became a ‘rogue’ nation-state in the eyes of the international community 
(Hoskyns 1968). Historically, African liberation followed one or more conflicting characteristics. 
For some, the liberation movement championed political view which called for a complete 
break-away from the Western powers at independence as a way to gain a greater level of 
autonomy (Nyerere 1968; Hoskyns 1968). Other countries decided to hold on to the capitalist 
principles introduced by the colonists with the hope that Western capital would boost economic 
stability within their context (Hoskyns 1968). Thirdly, other countries only fought against the 
colonisers as a way to get rid of the white settlers among them and reclaim their traditional 
hierarchical relations (Saul 2011).  Apparently, Tanzania, in its independence, resisted Western 
strategies regarding “internal and external developments” (Hoskyns 1968: 448), and fell within 
what could be termed as ‘politically and economically marginalised nation-states’ segments. 
Even though Tanzania under Mwalimu Nyerere’s administration remained critical of and 
resisted advances made by the international community for 24 years after its independence (1961 
– 1985), and even though Ujamaa policies supported mining activities by local community 
members (Chachage 1993/2009), the pressures from the World Bank and the International 
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 Taking the country’s topmost job shortly after a long period of colonial rule, which presented many facets since 
1776 until Tanzania’s independence in 1961, Mwalimu Nyerere saw no better way to proceed than “to build and 
nurture ‘territorial nationalism’ based on a sovereign independent state” as opposed to the requirement by the Pan 
African movement to “to dissolve individual sovereignty” (Shivji 2012: 104). 
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Monetary Fund (IMF) became overwhelming. Mwalimu Nyerere’s administration was 
determined not to give in completely to the Fund’s demands. But seeing the deplorable 
conditions in which the citizens lived, in early 1970s the government compromised and accepted 
the proposed changes (Nord et al 2009) including, “…stimulation of exports by devaluation and 
rationalization of the producer price scheme; reduction of budget deficits by strict control of 
public spending, the parastatal sector included; and liberalization of inter-regional trade” 
(Biermann & Wagao 1986: 95). Tanzania then received two fund disbursements between 1973 
and 1977 from the World Bank (WB) following an assessment report in 1973 which gave 
Tanzania “an excellent performance rating” (Holtom 2005: 552). Mwalimu Nyerere’s 
administration used the funds to address urgent needs of its citizenry such as education, health 
and other social services. This decision by the Mwalimu Nyerere administration only intensified 
animosity between the Bank and the Fund
16
 (Holtom 2005; Death 2012; Hoskyns 1968 
Biermann & Wagao 1986; Pratt 1999). This led to the alienation of Mwalimu Nyerere’s 
administration from international development partners from the European Economic 
Community (EEC), including France and West Germany.  
In 1982 Tanzania ceded to the structural adjustment policies (SAPs). As a starting point, 
Tanzania began its path to ‘economic recovery’ with the National Economic Survival Program 
(NESP) establishment, followed by the implementation of the Economic Recovery Program 
(ERP). Since the ERP followed all the conditions that were laid by the Bank and the Fund, it 
“won the first IMF Stand-by Arrangement in mid-1986, and then the second ERP in 1989” 
(MacDonald & Roe 2007: 19). Since 1985, Tanzania has gone through significant mineral sector 
legislation changes. Finally, in 1995 the implementation of the neoliberal economic system was 
launched by the William Mkapa’s government.  Since the introduction of the neoliberal capitalist 
market-led economic system in Tanzania various changes have been made to the Tanzanian 
mineral policies with an aim to both attract foreign investment to the country and improve 
lifestyles of the people of Tanzania. However, the promises of prosperity through the 
implementation of the neoliberal economic system by Mkapa’s administration (Lissu 2001), 
conflicts with the deepening poverty among the people of Tanzania in the face of plenteous 
mineral deposits and natural resource endowments.  
                                                          
16
 The terms ‘the Bank’ and ‘the Fund’ will be used (interchangeably) to indicate the World Bank (WB) and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) respectively. 
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Geological Environments of Tanzania  
Apart from Tanzania’s winning the description ‘harbour of peace’ in Africa due to 
political ‘moderation’ that has prevailed since its independence in 1961, Tanzania hosts a variety 
of mineral resource deposits (ref. Figure 1 below) economically viable (Lange & ESRF 2006). 
The mineral resources found in Tanzania include metallic minerals such as gold, iron, silver, 
copper, platinum, nickel and tin; gemstones such as diamonds, tanzanite, ruby, garnet, emerald, 
alexandrite and sapphire; industrial minerals such as kaolin, phosphate, lime, gypsum, diatomite, 
bentonite, vermiculite, salt and beach sand; building materials such as stone aggregates and sand; 
and energy minerals such as coal, uranium,
17
 and rare-earth. 
 
Figure 2: The Geological Map of Tanzania. Source: Geological Survey of Tanzania (GST) 2011. 
 
To understand the Tanzanian mining landscape it is imperative to look at historical 
narratives of Tanzania’s extractive/mining industry. Tanzania could ‘strictly’ be said to have 
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 The Mineral Sector Overview; accessed on April 11, 2014 at: http://www.mem.go.tz/mineral-sector/  
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two
18
 distinct periods within which mining activities occurred, namely the precolonial period and 
the European-dominated colonial period. The current mining regimes only have slight 
improvements on the colonial mineral policy frameworks while the practices in the mining sector 
in Tanzania remain essentially the same.  
It should be noted that a number of changes were made in Tanzania after the Arusha 
Declaration in 1967. The Declaration was followed by the nationalisation of several of industries 
between 1967 and early 1970s, mining included (Lange & ESRF 2006). Currently, the situation 
in Tanzania could be described as the ‘reinstatement’ of the colonial policies to govern and 
regulate the exploitation of mineral resources. Thus, the two mineral-based economic periods, 
namely 1967 – mid-1980s and 1995 - 2010 are foundational to this research. However, the latter 
period 1995 – 2010 remains the primary focus of this research. It suffices to mention though, that 
the period covering 1967 – mid-1980s speaks more of artisanal mining activities which are dealt 
with in detail later in chapter 5. This period was characterised by support to artisanal miners by 
the government which included different policies and bylaws enacted to protect the interest of 
artisanal miners as well as government revenues from the artisanal mining activities. The period 
covering 1995 – 2010 speaks much of the current mineral regimes in Tanzania. 
Mining Activities in the Precolonial Tanzania 
Contrary to the popular assumption that Tanzania’s mineral exploitation commenced 
towards the end of the 19
th
 century with prospecting by German prospectors, mineral 
exploitation activities apparently began in Tanzania between the 7
th
 and 8
th
 centuries
19
 
(Chachage 1993/2009; Emel et al 2011). This was earlier than in various other parts of Southern 
Africa, where mineral exploitation began in the 11
th
 century (Rodney 1981). Originally, mining 
activities were carried out by local community members in the mineral-rich areas in Tanzania. 
Such artisanal mining activities served local community members in the mineral-rich parts of the 
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 Most narratives considered in this work identify three periods of economic dispensation in relation to mineral 
sector economics in Tanzania. These could be described as the precolonial mineral regime, the colonial/European-
dominated mineral regime and the postcolonial/neoliberal mineral regimes. In the findings of this research, it 
appears that there are only two distinct periods within the Tanzanian mineral-based economic trajectories. 
19
 A number of writers give different dates as to the exact time the Arab merchants arrived in Tanzania but the dates 
lie between the 7
th
 and 8
th
 centuries. However, the presence of the Arab traders can be in the east coast of Africa as 
early as the 2
nd
 century (Beachey 1967). According to Chachage (1993/2009), “Mining activities in Tanzania are 
historically traceable to the precolonial period. Most known activities at the time consisted of mining and working 
on iron, copper and salt. Gold, unlike the other minerals which were primarily exploited by Africans, was being 
exploited to some scale by the Arab traders” (Chachage 1993/2009: 6).  
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country as a supplementary income source beyond farming (MacDonald & Roe 2007). In this 
early period, therefore, artisanal mining activities were not central to the livelihood of 
community members in the mineral rich areas in Tanzania. Such activities were carried out to 
meet the needs of the local community members, out of farming season,
20
 until the merchants 
from Arab countries entered the local mineral market between the 7
th
 and 8
th
 century (Chachage 
1993/2009; Emel et al 2011). 
The advent of the Arab merchants introduced a new dimension within production and 
trade relations. It introduced a production mentality which was not just geared towards 
subsistence but also opened a market for new agricultural and non-agricultural products – spices, 
salt, precious metals and stones. The latter were and are mainly concentrated in the Lake Regions 
and North-East/West parts of Tanzania. There are also significant mineral deposits spread 
country-wide.  
In their trade relations with the communities on the Swahili coast, the Arab merchants 
maintained high ethical standards in the way they related with local community members 
(Rodney 1981; Chachage 1993/2009; Emel et al 2011). However, to the Arab merchants the 
focus was not as much on the exploitation of mineral resources as it was on spices, salt, and later, 
slavery; they maintained fluidity in their trading practices. The market of the day and what can 
be said to have attracted the Arab merchants in the 8
th
 century is spices and salt trade. This 
seeming good relationship can be attributed to somewhat mutual goals between the Arab 
merchants and local community members.  
Arab merchants integrated their trade activities into local seasonal production practices. 
They would buy spice in season and gold mined using traditional tools when such products were 
available. Local community members seemed to have worked collaboratively with the Arab 
merchants in the extraction of gold, copper, iron and salt.
21
 According to MacDonald & Roe 
                                                          
20
 It is not clear what types of trading practices were present with respect to mineral exploitation in pre-Arab 
Merchants in the 7
th
 or 8
th
 centuries and precolonial era. It could be suggested though, that such mineral articles 
would be traded in exchange of grain and other basic commodities needed by the community members. Leaders in 
precolonial Tanzania could be said to have played the stewardship role just as reflected in the Ujamaa/Arusha 
Declaration 1967 period where the government had national grain banks which were sold back to the public at a 
subsidised cost.  
21
 History of the mining sector [in Tanzania], the Tanzania Chamber of Minerals and Energy (TCME); Accessed on 
March 04, 2014 at: http://www.tcme.or.tz/mining-in-tanzania/history/  
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(2007), collaborative trade relationships between local community members and Arab merchants 
spanned a period longer than a millennium.  
The years 1498 to 1560 present a peculiar period within the Tanzanian history. It was the 
beginning of restlessness among the community members. This struggle could be suggested to 
have evidenced in both the introduction of foreign religious beliefs and practices by the 
newcomers from Europe (Levi 2009), as well as the introduction of the ‘modern system’ of the 
pillaging of resources from Africa (Rodney 1981; Pouwels 2002; Chachage 1993/2009), 
especially in contrast to the traditional ways of mineral exploitation. Vasco Da Gama, a 
Portuguese explorer arrived on Unguja Island in 1498; this was followed by the conquest of the 
East African coastal belt which saw Portuguese domination of Pemba and Unguja Islands in 
Tanzania and Mombasa in Kenya between 1503 and 1506. The Pemba revolt followed in 1510, 
only to be subdued the same year (Akinola 1972; Nimaga 2011).  
As European colonial trade continued, Portuguese and other European migrants who 
came to the coast of East Africa at the beginning of the 16
th
 century, also came for the gold 
(MacDonald & Roe 2007). With the subsequent development of European colonialism in the 
mid-1800s, the associational life that was already established between the local community 
members and the Arab merchants was disrupted. What followed was chaos as slaves and 
community members turned against and killed their own leaders (Gray 1980; Higginson 1984). 
Some sources record that the Portuguese were not as good to the local people as were the Arab 
merchants. With the coming of Europeans, economic infrastructures that were already 
established within communities where the Arab merchants had settled were disrupted (AU & 
ECA 2011). Violence and suppression which resulted in the revolt seem to have taken a negative 
toll on the local economies. This resulted in a dwindling economic environment and harsh living 
conditions, forcing local community members to leave their homes to find peaceful areas where 
they could start new lives.
22
  
Clearly, the priorities of the Arab merchants were different from those of the European-
colonial Empire that followed, specifically, the Portuguese. It is noteworthy to mention that 
before the Great Depression in 1929, mining activities were not as important as cotton and coffee 
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 Tanzania: History, Foreign Contacts. Accessed on September 16, 2013 at: 
http://www.infoplease.com/encyclopedia/world/tanzania-history.html  
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farming in the economics and livelihoods of the population in the Lake Regions in East Africa 
(Roberts 1986).  
Mining Activities in the Colonial Tanzania 
European private foreign investment interest in Africa’s mining sector emerged in the 
mid-19th century. The industry at the time thrived and recorded rapid growth under the British 
colonial regime’s management and regulation. Business was, as it is today in Tanzania and a 
number of African mineral rich countries, conducted among the elites. As explained by Frick 
(2002); 
During the colonial period (roughly between 1850 and 1960) the Mining sector 
developed very rapidly and resulted in a world class industry in a number of regions on 
the continent which were producing a very large range of important minerals. Whereas 
the Colonial Governments provided the political, administrative and scientific knowledge 
frameworks for the industry, the capital, initiative and skills were mainly provided by 
private companies and individuals with equity raised on the European Stock Exchanges 
or through private stock issues. The development of the mining industry thus resulted 
largely through a form of direct foreign investment even though the investments were in a 
way captured investments by individuals or companies from the specific colonial power 
in their own colonies (Frick 2002: 3).
23
 
Historically, the Portuguese, British and Belgians were responsible for the colonial 
practices in Africa’s mining industry (AU & ECA 2011). The popular account about the 
European “discovery” of gold in Tanzania, according to some writers, was in 1884, in the Lake 
Regions of Tanzania (Lange & ESRF 2006; Roberts 1986). However, others like MacDonald & 
Roe (2007) in their report “Tanzania Country Case Study, the challenge of mineral wealth: using 
resource endowments to foster sustainable development”, place the “discovery” of gold in 
Tanzania in the year 1894. While the European colonial mining regime did commence in the late 
19
th
 century, it should never-the-less be stressed, as indicated above, that gold was discovered in 
Tanzania even before Vasco Da Gama and other Europeans invaded Tanzanian mineral rich 
areas in 1498 and 1560. 
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 Excerpt from a presentation at the OECD Conference on Foreign Direct Investment and the Environment in Paris 
– France. Accessed on September 16, 2013 at: http://www.oecd.org/env/1819712.pdf 
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Another view widely in circulation among development practitioners is that “large-scale 
mining in Tanzania was formally established in 1997, facilitated by the country’s new Mineral 
Policy” (Goldstuck & Hughes 2010: 9). This claim overlooks the point made above: commercial 
large-scale mining in Tanzania commenced towards the end of the 19
th
 century
 
and the beginning 
of the 20
th
 century. Furthermore, it does not acknowledge the historical significance of the 
discovery of gold in the Geita, Kahama and Sekenke areas of the Lake Victoria Goldfields in the 
mid-1880s. The claim above does not even begin to acknowledge that the Sekenke gold mine 
could be described as the prototype for modern mining ventures in Tanzania. According to 
MacDonald & Roe (2007): “The first mine to start producing gold was the Sekenke in Iramba 
district in 1909. Other mines began operation in the Geita and Musoma districts in 1913 during 
the German colonial administration” (MacDonald & Roe 2007: 20). 
In colonial Tanzania, mining activities started in the mid-19
th
 century (Frick 2002; Giblin 
1992
24
) and the first multinational mining project commenced in 1884
25
 after gold was 
discovered in the Lake Nyanza region (MacDonald & Roe 2007). “The German colonial 
government (1884 - 1917) introduced the concession system which gave companies exclusive 
mining rights over large areas” (Lange & ESRF 2006: 14). The colonial era was marked by 
domination through dispossession, by the influx of Europeans into the mineral rich areas in the 
colony, by land appropriation, expatriation of resources such as plants and wild animals and the 
creation of parks and large mining sites which led to the forceful displacement of the local 
community members (Mansfield 2007). In his views, Death (2012) writes that both German and 
British colonists “established particularly coercive, command-and-control styles of 
environmental planning and management, as elsewhere in the colonies” (Death 2012: 7). 
The politics of the colonial power seemed indifferent to the needs of the local 
communities. Appropriated land, mineral extraction and the illegal transportation of plants and 
animals to foreign lands were all for the benefit and economic security of the dominant power. In 
the case of Tanzania, the resource exploitation, especially in the mining sector, was for the 
benefit, material security and furtherance of the European colonial enterprise, principally that of 
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 Giblin (1992) writes extensively on environmental discourse in Tanzania, with a particular focus on agriculture 
and impacts of famine in Tanzania in his work titled, “The Politics of Environmental Control in Northeastern 
Tanzania, 1840-1940, published by the University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia - USA  
25
 http://www.tcme.or.tz/mining-in-tanzania/history/  
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the British colonial powers. The well-being of the general population throughout Africa, 
including Tanzania, was considered insignificant in the main decision-making processes. 
Contemporary mineral regimes in Tanzania could be said to have similarities to the colonial 
mineral regimes if not the very building blocks in the continuation of imperialistic legacy.  
The Building Blocks of Imperialistic Legacy 
In the period preceding independence through to 1967, both mining operations and the 
agricultural sector were under private, foreign investor ownership (Lange and ESRF 2006; 
Wobst 2001
26
). After the Arusha Declaration 1967 the government acquired majority shares in a 
number of industries. As one of the main economically viable sectors, mining was one of the 
industries nationalised by Mwalimu Nyerere’s administration (Lange & ESRF 2006). This was 
followed by the establishment of the State Mining Corporation (STAMICO) in 1977, a period 
characterised by unproductivity (Lange & ESR 2006; MacDonald & Roe 2007; Wobst 2001).  
At the time poor governance and a lack of skilled personnel (Frick 2002; AU/ECA 2011) 
to run the mines were cited to be the factors mitigating against the nationalisation strategy by the 
Tanzanian State under the Mwalimu Nyerere administration. Concurrent with the critique of 
state mining, the principles of the Arusha Declaration of 1967 were modified to make room for 
structural adjustment policies (SAPs).  
The Foreign Investment Act of 1963 was replaced by the new National Investment 
Promotion and Protection Act of 1990. This act made provisions for incentives and guarantees to 
the investors to further attract foreign investment (Lange & ESRF 2006; Munganyizi 2012). This 
was followed by the formulation of the Mineral Policy of Tanzania (1997) and the repealing of 
the 1979 Mining Act, which paved the way for the Tanzanian Mining Act (1998). These two 
regulatory instruments made it clear that the government’s role was no longer that of a regulator 
with authority to reprimand MMCs in case of any operational malpractices on but mere promoter 
of business in the mining industry to potential investors. Further to this, these regulatory tools 
were seen as setting a business platform on which both large-scale multinational mining 
corporations and small-scale (artisanal) miners would operate, equally. This was done with the 
belief that large-scale - multinational corporations (MNCs) and artisanal miners’ activities could 
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 According to the report commissioned by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), the 
agricultural sector thrived mainly as Tanzania had adopted the World Bank’s “transformation approach” (Wobst 
2001).  
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be done side by side (URT 1997; URT 1998). By this time in Tanzania’s mining areas, artisanal 
mining were almost insignificant as most of the areas where artisanal mining activities occurred 
were licensed to foreign mining companies.  
 
Figure 3: Multinational Senior Mining Companies in the Lake Victoria Gold Fields since 1995. Source: 
HelioResources Corp 2009: http://www.helioresource.com/i/maps/Tanzania-Map-DTM-Feb-09-1.jpg 
 
As seen on the map above, out of the 8 senior gold mine operations in Tanzania, 
Canadian Barrick Gold Corporation (BGC) and its British-based African subsidiary, African 
Barrick Gold (ABG)
27
 owns and operates four gold mines namely Bulyanhulu, North Mara, 
Buzwagi and Tulawaka
28
, including Kabanga Nickel. The formulation of Mining Policy 1997 
and the enactment of Mining Act 1998 further attracted other investors. From the inception of 
trade liberalisation in 1995 to 2014, Tanzania’s mining sector has attracted over forty different 
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 The timeframe of mining rights and mining activity concessions in Tanzania, in relation to Canadian multinational 
mining companies, especially Barrick Gold is difficult to pinpoint. Most of Barrick Gold operations were ‘grafted’ 
on to other original agreements as will be seen in the following chapters.  But they can be traced as far back as 1983. 
Yet it would be satisfactory to say that mining concessions started in mid 1990s.  
28
 According to News reports “Mining operations at the Tulawaka mine ceased in 2013 with the gradual decrease of 
reserves. STAMICO, Tanzanian state-owned mining company, acquired the mine and its surrounding exploration 
licenses from African Barrick Gold (ABG) and Canada-based MDN Northern Mining in January 2014”. Information 
accessed on June 4, 2014 at: http://www.mining-technology.com/projects/tulawaka-gold-mine/  
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foreign mining companies and nineteen associate or mining equipment supply companies. These 
new arrangements led to the closure of STAMICO, the establishment of the Tanzania Investment 
Centre (TIC) in 1997, (Lange & ESRF 2006).  
Mine Location Operator Mineral 
Bulyanhulu Kakola – Kahama  African Barrick Gold Gold 
North Mara Tarime – Mara  African Barrick Gold Gold 
Buzwagi  Buzwagi – Kahama  African Barrick Gold Gold 
Tulawaka Biharamulo – Kagera  African Barrick Gold Gold 
Kabanga Nickel Kabanga – Kagera  African Barrick Gold & Xtrata Nickel 
Geita  Geita – Mwanza  AngloGold Ashanti Gold 
Williamsons Mwadui – Shinyanga  Williamsons Diamond Diamond 
Golden Pride Nzega – Tabora  Resolute Tanzania Ltd Gold 
Buhemba Musoma – Mara Lake Victoria Mining Co. Gold 
 
Figure 4: Addendum of the mine sites identified on Figure 3 above. 
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The table below lists active mining operations in Tanzania since it ratified trade liberalisation policies in 1995.
 29
   
Senior Mining companies 
 
ML: Mining License  PL: Prospecting License SML: Special Mining License PML: Primary Mining License
32
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 Part of this information indicating “Senior” and “Junior” mining companies depicts members of the Tanzania Chamber of Minerals and Energy (TCME). 
Information accessed on June 16, 2014 at: http://www.tcme.or.tz/home/our-members/ 
30
 ABG/BGC owns and operated 4 gold mines in Tanzania. ABG/BGC operating areas include KMCL in Bulyanhulu, North Mara Mine (formerly Afrika 
Mashariki Gold Mines – Placer Dome), Buzwagi Gold Mine, and Tulawaka Gold mine. ABG/BGC also jointly owns and operates the Kabanga Nickel project 
with Xstrata as of February 2007. The announcement of this joint venture was accessed on June 17, 2014 at: http://www.barrick.com/investors/news/news-
details/2007/BarrickandXstrataAnnounceSignificantDevelopmentsatKabangaNickelProject1520071200902/default.aspx  
31
 South Africa and United Kingdom 
32
 This information was accessed at: http://www.flexicadastre.com/Tanzania/  
  
Registered Name 
Owned 
in % Operator Origin # Licenses ML PL SML Area(s) 
African Barrick Gold
30
 Canada 119 3 109 4 Bulyanhulu 
Buzwagi 
North Mara 
Bulyanhulu Gold Mine Ltd. 
Pangea Minerals Ltd. 
North Mara Gold Mine 
100 
100 
100 
Geita Gold Mine Ltd SA/UK
31
 12 PML    Geita - Mwanza Central Geita Gold Mines Ltd. 100 
Golden Pride Australia N/A    Nzega - Tabora   
Williamsons Diamond Canada/SA N/A    Mwadui - Shinyanga   
TanzaniteOne Mining UK 6 1 5  Arusha Tanzanite One Mining Ltd. 100 
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33
 Co.: Company. The Kabanga Nickel also hold 1 Retainer License (RL) 
34
 Cnd: Canada 
35
 Various mining companies, for example Canadian Uranium One, Russian Rosatom Corp. (a subsidiary of ARMZ Uranium Holding Co.) are operating the 
Nyota Prospect uranium project under Mantra Resources Ltd. 
36
 Tanzania 
Junior Mining companies  
Operating Under/Registered As 
Owned 
in % Operator Origin # Licenses ML PL SML Area(s) 
Bafex Tanzania Ltd Canada     Rukwa Helio Resource Corporation  100 
Canaco Tanzania Ltd Canada     Handeni   
Currierose Resources Canada     Mwanza   
Lakota Resources Ltd Canada     Shinyanga   
Tanzania Royalty Corp. Canada 14  13 1 Mwanza Buckreef Gold Company 100 
Twig Gold Ltd. Canada     Nzega   
SIKA Resources Canada 120 PML   10  Various Several ownership/shares Various 
MDN (T) Limited Canada     Biharamulo   
Kabanga Nickel Co.
33
 Cnd
34
/Australia 6  5  Ngara Kabanga Nickel Company Ltd. 50%
x2 
Continental Nickel Cnd/Australia     Nachingwea  70/30% 
Indago Resources Cnd/Australia     North Mara  49/51% 
Mantra Resources
35
 Australia     Namtumbo   
Western Metals Tz
36
 Australia 33  33  Namtumbo Western Metals Uranium Ltd. 100 
Uranex Tanzania Ltd. Australia     Bahi   
TANZOZ (T) Limited Australia     Not Clear   
Coeur Tanzania Ltd. United States     Bunda   
Savannah Exploration UK     Not Clear   
Shanta Mining Co. UK     Chunya and Singida   
Rangold Resources Ltd SA/UK     Musoma   
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Even though contemporary mining in Tanzania has been widely promoted by both 
Benjamin Mkapa (1995 – 2005) and Jakaya Kikwete’s administrations (2006 – Present), it is 
nevertheless wracked by governance problems. Observers put forward assertions of rapid growth 
in the Tanzanian extractive/mining sector as a possible source of economic stability to 
Tanzanians (MacDonald & Roe 2007; Lange & ESRF 2006; Death 2012). The social, economic 
and environmental conditions among the people of Tanzania, especially those living in the gold 
mining areas, are deplorable amidst the glitter of gold. The situation in Tanzania presents what 
seems to be a historical challenge. The lack of political will. This is a challenge found throughout 
underdeveloped and perhaps even some developed countries. Many countries in Africa lack a  
strong if not a deliberate political will to formulate laws and enforce such laws to make sure that 
natural resource revenues actually benefit people in the countries (and regions) where these 
reserves are found.  
In his writings Mwalimu Nyerere seems to acknowledge the imbalance between Ujamaa 
principles which sought to protect Tanzania’s independence and freedom to formulate its own 
regulatory frameworks, and on the other development through foreign aid. In his own words he 
says the following: 
The first responsibility of the government – its first principle – is the protection of 
Tanzania’s independence and its freedom to determine its own policies both internal and 
external […] yet this principle has already cost us aid from West Germany, and is 
undoubtedly affecting the quantity of aid from the other sources (Nyerere 1968: 189). 
Tanzania has gone through significant changes related to mineral sector legislation. This 
has had varying impacts at different societal levels. Tanzanian governments have tried to 
formulate mineral policies which would, on one hand, attract foreign investment to the country 
and on the other hand, ensure that its people were well provided for. However, the paradox of it 
all lies in the reports of success in the implementation of the neoliberal capitalist market-led 
economic policies and the deepening poverty among the people of Tanzania (AU/ECA 2011). 
The Tanzanian state appears to have abandoned or forgotten the citizens living in mineral-rich 
regions of the country while collaborating with ‘imperialist’ Canadian extractive industries. As 
such, it appears that the Tanzanian government is more responsive to foreign (such as Canadian) 
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corporate interests than to local needs, and seems unable to prioritize the interests of the 
citizenry, especially communities in the vicinity of mineral resources. 
Since before the time of Arab merchants, local community members in Tanzania had 
already developed their ways of extracting gold and other precious metals and stones. It is 
important here to stress that at this early stage (between 4
th
 and 8
th
 centuries) indigenous 
knowledge was widely used in natural/mineral resource exploitation as well as appropriation of 
mineralised lands by the colonial powers (AU & ECA 2011). Until recently (1999 – 2008), 
Tanzania recorded a gross annual earning of up to “$890 million” (Roe and Allan 2009: 18) from 
the extractive sector. While this record is verified, it appears that such profits are externalised to 
the benefit countries of the MMCs origin (Gordon 2010; AU & ECA 2011; Dumett 1985). It 
could not be overemphasised that the neoliberal capital market-led economy in Tanzania 
championed by the neoliberal proponents within the Tanzanian political administrations acted as 
a catalyst to resource pillage
37
 and “a means of private accumulation and wealth” (Shivji 2012: 
112).  
Methodology 
My interest in selecting this topic for my Major Paper resulted from the work I have done 
over the years with a number of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in the Southern 
African Development Community
38
 (SADC). As an activist passionate about social justice 
issues, I found myself at a loss to understand why the majority of rural community members in 
the mining areas live in abject poverty in the midst of plenteous mineral wealth in their ancestral 
land. To understand this context, I desired to examine in depth what might be wrong with the 
management of natural resources within the political boundaries of African governments and the 
histories of colonial rules; also, to understand how this has affected prospects for the prosperity 
of their people. To start this journey, it seemed practical to start with the Tanzanian government. 
In this Major Paper research, I employ document analysis. Its analyses is based on 
Parliamentary Hansards from the PURT (2008 – 2010), Ministerial and other government 
reports, news reports, reports published by non-state actors - CSOs,
39
  and scholarly literature. 
                                                          
37
  In being co-opted, a very small number of political elite appear to be enjoying their share of the bounty. 
38
 Tanzania is part of the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC). 
39
 Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) is used here as an inclusive term for all the non-state actors. 
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Chapters 1, 2 and 3 have utilised more of the academic material related to the individual chapters 
as well as government policy documents from the government of the United Republic of 
Tanzania (URT). Chapters 4 and 5 are a combination of Parliamentary Hansards from the PURT, 
Ministerial reports, News reports and scholarly papers related to respective sections.  
Organisation of the Major Paper 
In addressing the research question, the various sections of this Major Research Paper 
give, in Chapter one,  a general historical background of Tanzania and its extractive/mining 
sector to date by contrasting the extractive/mining sector in precolonial, colonial and 
contemporary neoliberal structures; Chapter two attempts to understand African leadership and 
governance structures through the lenses of the Marxist school of thought by looking at the 
formation of African leadership and governance structures. It explores how the formative and 
colonial years have shaped or impacted the current leadership and governance structures within 
the Tanzanian context; with different structures at play within the Tanzanian leadership and 
governance system; Chapter three explores how cultural leadership and governance structures 
have contributed to the current governance structures in Tanzania; Chapter four examines the 
characteristics of the contemporary mineral-based trade relations between Tanzania; and Chapter 
five highlights and connects the historical and  neoliberal mineral regimes realities in Tanzania. 
Chapter six concludes that leadership structures that evolved over time – since Tanzania became 
independent but significantly, since the demise of the Ujamaa policies driven government (1986 
– current) are but serving the imperialist system introduced in Tanzania in mid-1600s. 
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Chapter 2 
Conceptual Framework: The Making of ‘African’ Leaders 
 
The State cannot enshrine and reproduce political domination exclusively through repression,  
force or naked violence, but directly calls upon ideology to legitimize violence and contribute to a 
consensus of those classes and fractions which are dominated from the point of view of political power. 
Ideology is always class ideology, never socially neutral. In particular, the ruling ideology constitutes 
an essential power of the ruling class 
(Poulantzas 1980: 28)  
 
One of the questions asked by different development practitioners is; ‘What are some of 
the historical structural – even colonial factors contributing to the apparent ineffective leadership 
and governance structures in Tanzania?’ ‘What are the factors that contribute to the unresponsive 
leadership and governance structures in the African continent which leads to the mismanagement 
of its resources and deepening levels of poverty among citizens of the African countries, such as 
Tanzania?’ and ‘What role does the Tanzanian government play in directing the affairs of the 
United Republic of Tanzania? 
 This chapter attempts to understand and explain African leadership and governance 
structures from the lenses of the Marxist school of thought. It looks at the formation of African 
leadership and governance structures, and how the formative and colonial years might have 
shaped or impacted the current leadership and governance structures within the Tanzanian 
context.  
The evolution of ‘African’ Leadership and Governance Structures 
African leadership and governance structures were founded on lineage and/or kinship 
because land was communally owned within families and clans. This factor predicated livelihood 
patterns and called for an authority figure who could provide a sense of direction in terms of 
leadership for one such respective family/clan. Land was not just a heritage, but a major factor in 
bringing the community members together, not just within a particular local context but also with 
other members of the community at large – members from other clans and even from other 
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regions – as they traded goods harvested from subsistence agricultural activities and animal 
husbandry. There were also significant political dynamics, which Hamilton and Wright (1990) 
have captured when they state in their work on leadership structures in the AmaLala clan of the 
Zulu tribe in South Africa. In their research Hamilton & Wright (1990) reveals that acceptance 
into or exclusion from a different kinship by way of marriage or covenant served to indicate 
members of a certain community’s politically included or excluded. 
Until the 19
th
 century, leadership and governance structures in Africa were communal. In 
the accounts given on the engagement of Arab merchants with local community members in the 
Swahili Coast, there is no particular mention of expropriation of land from local community 
members, but allusion is made to a kind of a relationship where local community members 
laboured, using traditional instruments for agricultural or mineral production to fulfil the 
demands of the Arab merchants (Sweezy & Dobb 1950). By the time Arab merchants settled in 
the Swahili Coast, it appears that most of the economic activities were of ‘feudal’ nature. The 
locals leased vast tracts of land to the Arab merchants. This resulted in local community 
members working for Arab landlords for livelihood purposes (Sweezy & Dobb 1950; Brown 
1974; Bhaduri 1973). It could be suggested agricultural activities including animal husbandry 
were done using local knowledge. In other words, Arab merchants did not see the need to alter 
local epistemologies.  
But the emergence of European colonial powers introduced new systems of learning and 
production. This required a new set of knowledge among local community members that would 
assist
40
 in the expansion of European domination. A few members of a community were selected 
to take part in such education which was geared to further “the domination and exploitation of 
the [African] continent as a whole” (Rodney 1981: 240), an education characterised by a number 
of attributes. In the first place, the education was foreign; it introduced foreign concepts among 
the local community members. The selective nature of this education brought a rift between 
community members as it not only implied favouritism of a kind, but also caused the selected 
                                                          
40
 Marx and Engels, in their famous “Manifesto of the Communist Party” (1848) put it this way, “The bourgeois 
clap-trap about the family and education, about the hallowed co-relation of parents and child, becomes all the more 
disgusting, the more, by the action of Modern Industry, all the family ties among the proletarians are torn asunder, 
and their children transformed into simple articles of commerce and instruments of labour”, (Marx & Engels 1848: 
24, 26). 
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members of the community to feel a little more important than the ones who were not selected 
for this foreign education. Conservation skills for sustainable use of resources were not 
inculcated, nor were help to create confidence and promote pride in being an African. Apart from 
the fact that this education did not take into consideration the pillars of the African societies (and 
hence the values that are communicated through community learning and language), it did not 
have depth to equip the local community members for employment beyond cheap labour 
(Rodney 1981; AU & ECA 2011). Also, this education had qualitative differences compared to 
that given to the European children. The European colonial education in pre-independence 
Tanzania was carried out in a few selected areas. For example: 
…inside [colonial] Tanganyika, a map showing the major cotton or coffee areas virtually 
coincides with a map showing areas in which colonial education was available. [This] 
means that those whom colonialists could not readily exploit were not offered even the 
crumbs of education (Rodney 1981: 243).  
Not only was this education meant to create a sense of difference between Africans and 
Europeans, it also created an uneven field of development among the community members 
socially and academically; it was used as an effective and systematic, if not structural, means to 
“eradicate African political power” (Rodney 1981: 226) by depoliticising selected Africans by 
imposing European political views and understanding through the colonial education system.  
The sociopolitical and economic environment created by the European colonial powers in 
the African soil resulted in household rivalry and hate. This could be described as ‘selective 
despotism’.41 Local community members who were not working closely with the white European 
settlers felt marginalized in the colonial power structure as well as estranged from the 
community members selected to work for the colonisers. Another type of hate was that coming 
from the colonially
42
 educated community members, hating their own traditions as required by 
the colonisers, if they were going to be loyal. Yet another type of hate was that which the 
“colonised intellectuals” (Fanon 2004) felt against the colonisers when they realised that by 
siding with the colonists, they risked exclusion from their communities, families and kin (Fanon 
                                                          
41
 This term “selective despotism” suggests a system which uses a select group of oppressed persons to exercise 
power over the entire community.  
42
 The terms “colonially educated” and “colonised intellectuals” are used interchangeably to refer to African people 
who received Eurocentric colonial education 
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2004). This latter component of hate, the hate of white colonial oppressor could be said to have 
been carried into African liberation struggles.  
African Leadership and Governance in the Liberation Movement 
Leadership and governance appear to be fundamental in any discussion on factors 
weakening or strengthening social, economic and political structures. In his work “How Europe 
Underdeveloped Africa” Rodney (1981) highlighted that during European colonial era in a 
number of African countries, the European colonists economic security needs outweighed the 
racial theories. However, racial factors certainly played a role in defining the European colonist’s 
agenda.
43
 Given that race remained a significant basis for oppressions, calls for liberation 
emerged from both African community members who lived under oppression and from the local 
community members who served as agents for the colonial domination. In a speech on African 
liberation, Eduardo Mondlane
44
 (1920 – 1969) is quoted saying that the Mozambican liberation 
efforts were characterised by hate. And that he acknowledged that Frente de Libertacao de 
Mocambique
45
 (FRELIMO) was formed out of “hatred of colonialism and the belief in necessity 
to destroy the colonial structure and to establish a new social structure” (Saul 2011: 20).  
Suggested in that excerpt from Mondlane’s speech is the fact that in the wake of calls for 
African liberation in the 1950s, there was a glaring lack of a concrete political ideology and 
implementation plan among African liberation (Saul 2011). But such a blanket statement 
undermines the sociopolitical credibility of the personalities who embodied this struggle such as 
Kwame Nkrumah, Patrice Lumumba, Gaafar Nimeyri, Kenneth Kaunda, and Julius Nyerere etc. 
However, it can be assumed that African liberation fathers of many newly-independent African 
nations assumed that “…they had the freedom to plan their development in ways compatible 
with their own economic and cultural traditions” (Sethi 2011: 5). It could be suggested further 
that the African liberation pioneers believed that they could merge both Eurocentric colonial and 
                                                          
43
 This point was well explained by CLR James (1901 – 1989) who is quoted by Rodney (1972) to have said, “The 
race question is subsidiary to the class question in politics, and to think of imperialism in terms of race is disastrous. 
But to neglect the racial factor as merely incidental is an error only less grave than to make it fundamental” (Rodney 
1972/1981: 89). 
44
 Eduardo Mondlane was an educator, a nationalist, and the leader of the Mozambique independence movement 
Frente de Libertacao de Mocambique (FRELIMO). In 1969 Mondlane was killed by a bomb which had been 
disguised as a notebook and sent to him by unknown assassins. This is an excerpt on Mondlane from BlackPast.org 
online index, accessed on April 30, 2014 at: http://www.blackpast.org/gah/mondlane-eduardo-chivambo-1920-1969  
45
 Mozambican Independence Front 
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African cultural governance structures and values to produce a sociopolitical and economic 
system that would work.  
What seems plausible is the argument suggesting that African liberation fathers paid 
inadequate attention to the fact that colonial experience in Africa introduced new social, political 
and economic structures which appropriated “a very large part of the economic surplus [and] 
bureaucratically directed economic activity in the name of promoting economic development” 
(Saul 1974: 351). This was ultimately a threat to their assumed vision and mission to bring about 
social and economic development to benefit the citizenry without the involvement of foreign 
elements (Saul 2011). The neocolonial context, as theorized by Nkrumah (1965), Fanon (2004), 
Rodney (1972), etc. placed limitations on the revolutionary leadership in Africa. If they did not 
play the role of enabling “the neocolonialists to pursue their class interests in the postcolonial 
societies" (Saul 1974: 352), they would be socially, politically and economically ‘punished’. Out 
of fear of such punishment, which was accorded to African Freedom fighters such as Patrice 
Lumumba, Kwame Nkrumah and later Julius Nyerere, to name a few, many African leaders 
resorted to align political and economic of their countries to that of the colonial dominant 
powers.   
The Characteristics of the State Apparatus within the Tanzanian Context 
Tanzania has a vibrant history of peasantry.
46
 Its ‘liberation’ struggles brought together 
peasants and proletarian, a group which comprised of teachers, peasants and community 
members who can simply be called villagers
47
 (Stein 1985; Saul 1974; Engelbert 2000). A 
people whose livelihood was/is tied to tilling ancestral land or land allotted to them by the 
governing authorities. From a Marxist point of view, peasantry is subordinate to the dominant 
mode of production providing casual labour when needed. One of the peculiar characteristics of 
this traditional mode of production is that it is not deterred by the constraints pertinent to the 
world of neoliberal capitalist market-led economy (Roberts 1990). Proletarians on the other hand 
are members of the society who by virtue of having no means of production of their own, sell 
                                                          
46
 It should be noted though that peasants and proletarians in the context of Ujamaa polity are rather fluid words and 
require a lot of caution. This caution is related to the fact that there is a rather insignificant line of division when 
these two groups are discussed. The same peasant you saw becomes the proletarian you are yet to meet. In other 
words these words identified, to a greater extent, the same coin with different identities on each side. 
47
 In the Tanzanian context villagers have long been identified with subsistence farming and pastoral activities in the 
rural settings. 
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their services for a wage. This group has been seen as the most vocal when it comes to 
demanding the rights of the working class. 
Because of their colonially received knowledge, several writers on the subject of 
“postcolony” have viewed the role of the postcolonial State apparatus as inherited from the 
coloniser. The argument behind this claim is that the postcolonial leaders do not have 
independent perspectives from the received colonial principles (Mbembe 2001: 24). If this claim 
is true, then, the State in Tanzania
48
 assumed the role of authority patterned after the dominating 
culture of the imperialistic and colonial rule – characterised by systems of “subjection” (Stein 
1985; Mbembe 2001; Fanon 2004 Saul 1974; Mbembe 2001). This theory is supported by the 
works of Miliband (1969) in the discussions on “advanced capitalism” and the production of the 
“managerial and corporate ‘new class’”, (Miliband 1969: 38). Apart from suggesting that 
industrial relations, which could be considered from similar perspectives as political relations, 
“remains one of domination and subjection”, he goes on and elaborates (and echoing sentiments 
from Fanon 2004) that: 
…the industrial armies of  advanced capitalism, whoever their employers may be, 
continue to function inside organisations whose patterns of authority they have had no 
share in bringing into being, and to the determination of whose policies and purposes 
they have made no contribution (Miliband 1969: 39) 
This leads to asking the question as to whether the leadership in the postcolonies was 
made up of bourgeois class. Was there a possibility that in Tanzania, there arose an elite 
capitalist class in the transition between the colonial regime and, specifically the transition from 
the capitalist economic trajectory to Ujamaa in the Arusha Declaration 1967?  
Marxists define the bourgeoisie as a group of people, few in number who hold ownership 
of the world’s wealth and means of production. It is a class born out of the feudal society which 
                                                          
48
  Tanzania claimed its independence from the British colonial authorities in 1961, which was followed by the 
union of Tanganyika, Unguja and Pemba Islands to become Tanzania in 1964. As a way to strengthen national 
autonomy, in 1967 the Tanzanian government under the leadership of Mwalimu Nyerere made a declaration, 
famously known as Azimio la Arusha 1967 (Arusha Declaration 1967). Enshrined in the Arusha Declaration was the 
call by the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) for nationalisation of the means of production, 
strengthening the agricultural sector among others, as strategies to lessen dependency on foreign entities and 
improve the lives of the people of Tanzania (Stein 1985). This period not only marked Tanzania’s departure from, if 
not contestation of, the capitalist mode of production but also Tanzania’s “transition [to] a bureaucratic [and] 
hegemonous” (Stein 1985: 106), economic and political systems. 
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in the contemporary reality reproduces itself through new forms of wealth accumulation and 
wage-labour relations (Marx & Engels 1848; Freyhold 1977; Panitch & Gindin 2012). According 
to Marx and Engels (1968), the bourgeoisie finds ways in the course of time, to connect with the 
political organisations or movements to advance and replicate itself. Given this definition and by 
its composition and early resistance to capitalism, Tanzania as a country cannot be said to have 
produced proper bourgeois class.  
Within the Tanzanian context, rather than the production of an elite bourgeois class, there 
arose a type of elite class identified by titles ranging from “bureaucratic bourgeoisie”, 
“exploitative/progressive factions”, Nizers,49 or a “faceless Class”, to “Wabenzi”50 (Shivji 2012; 
Stein 1985; Mueller 1981; Saul 1974; Freyhold 1977). This group, of elite class have by and 
large taken somewhat ‘neutral’ position. In their political vocation, they maintain social and 
political fluidity. This way they are able to have access to both the citizenry of their nation-states 
and the ruling class (Stein 1985; Mbembe 2001; Fanon 2004; Saul 1974). Therefore, the State 
apparatus in the postcolonies, including Tanzania, have ‘unwittingly’ or deliberately taken up the 
role of foreign economic interest intermediaries, and turning the State apparatus into “a terrain of 
[reckless] accumulation” (Shivji 2012: 106).  
The Tanzanian Government: Accountability and Structural Allegiances 
Very early in the post-independence period, Kwame Nkrumah (1965) coined the term 
“neocolonialism” to express the extent to which nominal political independence and sovereignty 
was limited by the reality of continued external or foreign economic domination and control. In 
some cases, this foreign control was maintained through the strategic creation of political elite 
that collaborated with foreign interests. Views expressed by Marxist theorists such as Fanon 
(2004) and Rodney (1972), capture in detail the nature of relationships between the coloniser and 
the colonised, the creation and production of social strata and how such capacities as created 
have been utilised to expand the European dominated imperialistic rule in the ‘former’ colonies 
beyond the physical presence.  
                                                          
49
 'Nizers' or 'nizations' (from Africanization) is a term applied by Tanzanians to refer to that stratum or class which 
social scientists have called 'educated elite', 'labour aristocracy', or 'petty bourgeoisie - those who took over 
important administrative and economic positions when colonialism was defeated […] 'Nizers' is a precise and 
dialectical term. It refers […] the progressive aspect of Africanization, to the promise that those who take over the 
power would return this power to the people on whose behalf they took it away from the colonialists’ (Murray 
1974). 
50
 Those who own Mercedes Benz vehicles as an indication of individual wealth and prosperity. 
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In Tanzania, leadership and governance structures at independence in 1961 not only 
carried elements of colonial dominant policies into the new government system but used 
employed expert capacity from the Colonisers in the initial establishment of the new nation-state 
(Hoskyns 1968). Consequently, “new classes, new conditions of oppression, new forms of 
struggle” (Marx & Engels 1848: 14) arose, as it were, to replace the old systems of oppression. 
Evidently, the old systems of oppression had been elevated to a different level which not only 
legalises the historical primitive accumulation but ensured that contesting voices are silenced by 
despotism or nepotism, co-optation or compradorship.  
Classical Marxist theories on the role of the State clearly indicate that State apparatus is a 
tool – an instrument, in the hands of the ruling class useful in enforcing pro-social stratum 
policies as well as guaranteeing the stability of the ruling class (Marx & Engels 1848; Marx & 
Engels 1968; Miliband 1969; Lenin 1974; Jessop 1982; Wetherly et al 2008). This theory finds 
its support in the partisan politics within capitalist market-led economies.
51
 Miliband’s work on 
the topic suggests that such systems are focused on producing leaders “who tend to succeed each 
other in office in […] capitalist countries [and] whatever their political labels or party 
affiliations, are bourgeois politicians”, (Miliband 1969: 69). This is clearly seen within the 
Tanzanian political context where most political leaders are groomed over time, starting at the 
lowest ranks in the political parties and ministerial departments and moving to a level where they 
become affluent politicians able to protect and promote the dominant party’s interests.  
There is no doubt that African leadership and governance structures have evolved over 
time and this could be the reason for the apparent shift from the traditional leadership and 
governance structures. It could be proposed here that leadership and governance structures up to 
the time of colonial aggression towards the end of the 16
th
 century were synthetic – that is to say, 
combined feudal and indigenous African characteristics. Apart from the force of European 
colonial domination being felt so strongly in Africa, due to a lack of strong united political 
convictions, it could be said that such entrenchment of European colonial ethics swiftly rooted 
                                                          
51
 Even though much of the preceding discussion gives perspectives on practices that took place before the rise of 
neoliberalism, it is difficult to pinpoint significant differences. Principally, terms and guidelines in the relations 
between the state apparatus then and now, remains fundamentally the same. 
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itself in the African context as Africans welcomed colonial powers through the lenses of 
Ubuntu
52
 philosophy, unaware of the intentions of the European settler community. 
Ineffectiveness of leadership and governance structures in Tanzania as well as other 
postcolonial States in Africa, especially in addressing political and economic affairs could be 
viewed in three different ways. First, from Mondlane’s speech cited above, the African liberation 
struggles were partly misguided and lacking concretely formulated political thought. Second, 
political theories adopted by African nation-states including Tanzania, immediately after 
‘liberation’ were not formulated independently from the ones that were in place during the 
colonial period (Rodney 1981; Fanon 2004). Affiliation with colonial political theories weakened 
young African postcolonial States from developing assertive, constructive and inclusive political 
theories to maintain African communal associational life as well as environmental values. Last, 
is the view which argues that postcolonial African leadership and governance structures were 
influenced by the desire to dominate. European colonial domination was based on mineral 
economics. Tanzanian mineral resources were accessed by the help of local leaders. Similarly, 
leaders in the postcolonial nation-states seek new social, political and economic alliances to 
protect and further wealth and political interests, regardless of the consequences to the citizenry.  
 
 
 
                                                          
52
 Ubuntu means ‘My humanity is caught up, is inextricably bound up, in yours.’ Human beings belong together in a 
bundle of life. A person is a person through other persons. A person with Ubuntu is open and available to others, 
affirming of others, does not feel threatened that others are able and good, for he or she has a proper self-assurance 
that comes from knowing that he or she belongs in a greater whole and is diminished when others are humiliated or 
diminished, when others are tortured or oppressed, or treated as if they were less than who they are (Paraphrased 
from Tutu, Desmond 1999: No Future Without Forgiveness; Published by Doubleday, Random House Inc. New 
York). 
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Chapter 3 
Cultural Structures and the Dynamics in State Decision-
making Processes 
 
…relationships which have redistributive elements can contain the germs of differentiation or be 
outright unequal 
(Guyer 1981: 101) 
The preceding chapters have explored various aspects of the formulation of leadership 
and governance structures in African. It is clear that European colonial structures left ‘indelible’ 
impacts on future leadership and governance structures in the postcolonial African States, 
including Tanzania. Hand in hand with this, it also appears that there are synthesised leadership 
and governance structures in Tanzania in particular.  Accusations from the Global North of 
corrupt leadership and lack of capacity in Africa are frequent. Indeed, different reports blame 
‘corruption’ and ‘lack of capacity’ as factors 53that lead to the deplorable living conditions within 
Africa’s social and political contexts, including that of Tanzania (AU/ECA 2011). Foreign 
management of natural/mineral resources within African States including Tanzania has focused 
on capacity building and uprooting graft; its social, political and economic structures are affected 
by kinship, ethnic/regionalism and household practices.  
With different structures at play within the Tanzanian leadership and governance system, 
this chapter explores how cultural practices in Tanzania have affected leadership and governance 
structures in Tanzania. How do kinship and household allegiances impact leadership and 
governance structures in Tanzania? How do nepotistic structures – cultural or political  - affect 
decision making processes in Tanzania leading to the mismanagement of its natural/mineral 
wealth endowments? And what are some theories that have been prominent in explaining 
underdevelopment in African countries, including Tanzania?  
                                                          
53
  In the multitude of divergent views invoking factors which have led to weak or failed states in Africa, cultural 
practices, i.e. ethnicity, kinship, household allegiances are rarely considered as major factors. This is done either by 
way of deliberate omission or by assumption that kinship, ethnicity and household politics doesn’t affect national 
leadership and governance structures. 
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The Role of Kinship and Ethnicity in the Tanzanian Politics 
Although at its independence in 1961 to the inception of Ujamaa policies in 1967 
Tanzania seemed to have played down tribalism and promoted a united Tanzanian society, these 
policies did not do away with household and kinship structures which continued to exist within 
the State power and decision-making processes in Tanzania. This was in large part due to the 
pre-existence of household and lineage structures within the Tanzanian society prior to colonial 
domination. Household structure in Tanzania were concerned with “domestic unit […] decision-
making autonomy [in relation to] production and consumption” (Guyer 1981: 89), on one hand, 
and lineage with “African local organisation” (Guyer 1981: 90) on the other.  
African leadership and governance structures were, and to a greater extent are still based 
on kinship (Samatar  1997; Guyer 1981). Even in the 21
st
 century, it would seem, there are still 
elements of extended relations, African traditional values and associational life in the leadership 
and governance structures. Such traditional values could be said to be comparable to those of 
native people in America, Guinea and other parts of the world (D’Azevedo 2009; Guyer 1981;. 
The difference is only found in the fact that in Africa, Western capitalist principles tend to seek 
an operational balance with African ways of life – traditional practices as pertaining to leadership 
and governance structures. This is different in other indigenous environments over time; native 
communities have been reduced to a minority both in economic and associational life 
environments (Guyer 1981).  
Even though traditional chiefdoms are not as discussed in the Tanzanian context as in 
other countries in Africa, especially in Southern and West Africa, there were, nevertheless, 
established kingdoms and or chiefdoms. Such advisory bodies were known as councils made up 
of “sub-chiefs [and] headmen”54 (D’Azevedo 2009; West 1998). These structures were (and still 
are in African countries like Zambia) equivalent to the local administration authorities. Chiefdom 
structures trace their foundations from the founding ancestor of one respective community. They 
are hierarchical and “arranged in accordance with [relationship] distance from this ancestor. 
Numerous attached groupings” (D’Azevedo 2009: 509) and future residents identified 
themselves by the name of the elder who led the community members to their settlement in the 
                                                          
54
 Prime Minister’s Office: Regional Administration & Local Government (PMORALG), accessed at: 
http://www.pmoralg.go.tz/menu-data/about-
us/history/HISTORY%20OF%20LOCAL%20GOVERNMENT%20SYSTEM%20IN%20TANZANIA.pdf  
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new locality (West 1998). This not only marked a territory belonging to a community, but a 
livelihood territory as well, and to a greater extent traditional political boundaries. With the help 
of the council members, the chiefs executed their roles among the community members. 
Fundamental decisions related to community’s welfare were therefore made consultatively 
between the chiefs, sub-chiefs and elders.  
Tanzania introduced a “descending” government system (Ingle 1972: 211), with the 
lowest rank being at the village level. The introduction of the “Ten-house cell”55 system in 
Tanzania in 1963 was seen by the Mwalimu Nyerere administration as a way to create a 
discursive platform within communities, establish accessibility structures (community members 
would easily have the ears of central government leaders) and be the medium through which 
needs of the local community members would be effectively communicated to the central 
government and obviously strengthening TANU, (Ingle 1972). The Ten-house cell was led by 
Mabalozi.
56
 Since Tanzania started working towards eradicating tribalism and focusing on 
building a united nation, leaders/elders were chosen from the immediate communities. Most of 
these leaders were appointed through consensus with respect to their good reputation and 
through recommendations from elders making up the village council. Empirically, there were 
and still are instances of conflict of interests as to the persons who would take the Balozi
57
 
position. Lineage, kinship and wealth played a decisive role. 
However, the Tanzanian political landscape has changed to comply with trends of 
capitalism which have gained momentum. The neoliberal capital market-led economic system 
has dominated social politics, as well as environmental and economic discourses within central 
and local governance structures. Such powers within local communities have now taken a more 
political strand and are bent “toward [a] more complex social differentiation” (D’Azevedo 2009: 
517). Guyer (1981) denotes that such changes could be traced back to a time when the 
terminology shifted from using such words as household/lineage to peasants. This shift marked 
the transition from a traditional African associational life to a more globalised view of life within 
an African setting, reflecting more and more Western/foreign ways of life. This adopted 
                                                          
55
 Ten-House Cell is a system in Tanzania which appoints a village council representative for a village council area 
consisting of ten households. The representative (an elder) of the Ten-house Cell unit is known as Balozi  
56
 “Ten-House Cell” elders (plural) in Kiswahili.  
57
 “Ten-House Cell” elder (singular) in KiSwahili 
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associational life promotes self-gratification and caring for one’s needs and that of one’s family, 
and divorcing one’s thoughts from the communal life that had characterised most communities in 
the African context for centuries. This trend is rife within the Tanzanian community, whether in 
politics, trade relations, or in recruitment circles.  
Ujamaa, even though it introduced a system where the state “[orchestrated] public and 
private accumulation [through an attempt] to restructure local and kinship relationships” (Guyer 
1981: 107), ownership of land, which is considered as the principal resource in Tanzania and a 
number of countries in Africa, remained in the hands of the newly formed kinship structures. The 
new economic dispensation in Tanzania not only brought differentiation, but also heightened the 
sense of the need for individual gain. Economic gain, in this case, seems to have taken 
precedence over other cultural values. While this should not be seen to suggest that family ties 
are severed, it does speak to the volatility introduced by the new focus – the neoliberal capitalist 
society trend within the Tanzanian communities. Ujamaa in Tanzania created new forms of 
household and kinship relations and reproduced synthetic ethnic
58
 practices, it also introduced 
another type of proletarian segment of the society characterised by economic nepotistic politics, 
partisan politics, and nepotistic partisan politics. It is important to make a distinction of these 
three viewpoints as they have importance in domestic politicking in Tanzania as relates to 
globalisation and development discourses. Economic nepotistic politics refers to the fact that 
family/household and kinship ties play an important role in the recruitment practices in Tanzania 
which, apart from demarcating household and or ethnic territory, serve as an assurance of 
economic security when members of such community groupings lose their work, and economic 
security. This has been described by the general public in Tanzania as “…getting in front of 
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 There are several aspects to the discussion about ethnicity in Africa, which, while important, lie outside the scope 
of this research.  First, ethnicity should be looked at from a larger grouping perspective. Tanzania is home to three 
large ethnic groups, the Bantu, the Nilotic and the Cushitic. Each grouping is made up of a number of clans. Ethnic 
grouping can also mean a small group of people, for example the indigenous people. These are represented by the 
hunter-gatherer communities, Akie (Ndorobo) and Hadzabe, and the pastoralist Barabaig and Maasai communities. 
These groups differ from the rest because of their unique lifestyles, but they still belong to the main three ethnic 
groups as noted above.  It is also important to note the different groupings in Tanzania – especially the difference 
between an ethnic group and a tribe. The latter represents one kinship group made up of community members who 
speak the same language and presumably come from the same ancestor or the first person who settled in an area. For 
example the Kurya, the Basweta, and the Chagga tribes are all from the Bantu ethnic group. Tanzania is the home to 
more than the three main ethnic groups, as it also has a long history of being the home of the Asian and Arabian 
diaspora communities. This research are limited to the Bantu, Nilotic and Cushitic ethnic groups.  
45 | P a g e :  E R u b a r a _ M E S :  M R P _ C o - O p t e d .  © 2 0 1 4  
 
someone who works in the relevant industry, and being remembered by them when the right 
opportunity arises”.59  
Partisan
60
 politics refers to political positions with the main focus on promoting one 
party’s politics. Such political inclination has only strengthened ruling class politics, hierarchy, 
and puppetry (Fanon 2004; Rodney 1981; Marx & Engels 1848; Marx & Engels 1968; Miliband 
1969; Mbembe 2001), and such trend is clearly seen in how the chieftain positions were used by 
the colonial dominant powers for intermediary purposes (Rodney 1981; Fanon 2004; Welsh 
1996; Guyer 1981; West 1998; Samatar 1997; Berg-Schlosser 1984).  
A third category within the African political landscape is partisan nepotism. This refers to 
a political trend which is family/household or kinship based. Even though Tanzania for a long 
time stood out among other East African Community (EAC) countries in maintaining a measure 
of ethnic diversity as far as leadership and political office-bearing roles are concerned, the 
country seems to be experiencing drastic changes with regards to this reputation. While Tanzania 
has had different phases
61
 of government transitions, all its leaders have come from the same 
party, Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM)
62, which led the country’s claiming independence.  
Such nepotistic practices are becoming more visible in Tanzania. For example, in recent 
news, opposition Members of the Parliament were cited as decrying the rising levels of nepotism 
within the Tanzanian labour industry. The Parliamentarians were quoted as saying that “…vacant 
posts in the civil service are either filled by 'Godfather' clientele methods, or by outright 
nepotism”.63 Even though this speaks of recruitment within the civil service, it is not, however, 
limited within the confines of civil service sector as it is also found within the civil society and 
                                                          
59
 This report goes further to explain that nepotism in Tanzania has entrenched itself in the labour sector to an extent 
that, “It is commonplace for even some public institutions to place a job vacancy in the newspaper as a formality 
after a position has already been occupied”. Accessed at: http://www.staffingindustry.com/row/Research-
Publications/Daily-News/Tanzania-Nepotism-undermining-recruitment-agencies-27184  
60
 Partisan politics cannot be said to be peculiar to the Tanzanian context, as it is a political practice widespread in 
Africa as well as other countries in the global south.  
61
 Since its independence in 1961 Tanzania has had 4 different heads of State who sprung from different ethnic 
groups. Mwalimu Julius Nyerere came from the Zanaki people of Tanzania, Al haj Hassan Mwinyi is from Kivure 
in the Tanzania’s Coast Region, Benjamin Mkapa is from Ndanda – Masai in the Southern part of Tanzania, and the 
fourth phase president of Tanzania, Jakaya Kikwete is from Msoga, a village in Bagamoyo District – Coast Region. 
62
 The Revolutionary party of Tanzania (CCM) was born out of the merger between Tanganyika African National 
Union (TANU) and Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) and was established in 1977. TANU/CCM has dominated Tanzanian 
political scene since the country’s independence.  
63
 “Tanzania: Address Nepotism Claims”; AllAfrica; Accessed at: http://allafrica.com/stories/200710310801.html  
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the recent decentralisation and devolution discourses in Tanzania (Berman 1998).  One of 
Tanzania’s most progressive social media hubs reveals that the problem of nepotism is becoming 
more and more visible, especially within the fourth sitting government, under the Kikwete 
administration. One of the discussants stated the following: 
... Now in Tanzania we see a very high level of nepotism in politics, and many people 
here seem to take this as normal. Some even give praises for this sad trend. I really don't 
understand Tanzanians. We see nepotism in ministerial posts picks. We see nepotism in 
public servants picks. We also see nepotism in [Members of Parliament] MPs picks, and 
some of these people are being prepared to be our future rulers, to replace their 
parents/seniors, and worse enough, no merits are always considered in these picks, and 
people sit here and offer their hypocritical congratulations. If Tanzanians (especially the 
educated ones) will fail to decry this open nepotism, then Tanzania will never change 
because these picks will always protect and conserve the status quo. In fact, nepotism is 
one of key features of [President Jakaya Kikwete’s] JK's leadership (you can't exclude 
this sad reality from his leadership). Tanzania may be leading on this untold reality in 
Africa (much as it leads in begging, albino killings, etc. etc. very sad indeed.
64
 
The statement above comments not only on how entrenched nepotism is within the 
governing systems, but also points out that such practices are condoned. This leads to the 
question “how is it possible for such a system to pursue equity and meet the needs of the general 
members of the Tanzanian public?”  
Of Nepotism and Distributive Justice 
A spoken word artist cum musician in Tanzania, Mrisho Mpoto in his celebrated song, 
“Nikipata Nauli”65 (If/When I get fare), focuses on Tanzanian politicians serving their own 
interests and those of their extended family members as a way to create security for their years 
out of employment. The song also talks about the passivity of political leaders in exacting justice 
for the marginalised citizens. And while joining the forces of graft on the one hand, by their 
actions and using their positions, they instil the sense of fear among the people by employing 
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 “Nepotism at its best: the untold reality about Tanzania!” Jamii Forums, March 29, 2012; Accessed at: 
http://www.jamiiforums.com/jukwaa-la-siasa/241310-nepotism-at-its-best-the-untold-reality-about-tanzania-2.html  
65
 “Nikipata Nauli”; Mpoto, Mrisho Nov 30, 2011; Accessed at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AVi35DxJ320  
47 | P a g e :  E R u b a r a _ M E S :  M R P _ C o - O p t e d .  © 2 0 1 4  
 
brute force. This song expresses the way politicians and public servants in Tanzania justify their 
wealth and flee public scrutiny – by giving evidence of being benevolent to their relatives. This 
song serves to show that the network system within the Tanzanian governance structures 
jeopardises decision-making processes which would result in distributive justice.  
Since the emergence of the SAPs (1970s), through to the Washington Consensus (1989) 
and the development project (1990s), Tanzania has attempted to ensure that it ‘judiciously’ 
follows the development frameworks set by the Bank
66
 and the Fund.
67
 Yet through such 
proposed efforts aimed at fostering political reform and equity participation, (and even if 
Tanzania is lauded by the international business community as making progress towards 
consummation into the neoliberal capitalist society) (Death 2012), “the evil triumvirate of 
patronage, corruption and [nepotistic trends appear to reassert] their retrograde influence”, 
(Berman 1998: 306) pulling it back into the archaic and imperialistic culture of domination.  
While there were exerted efforts during the African liberation to do away with kinship 
and ethnopolitics, the latter cannot be done away with as they are part and parcel of African 
society (Wunsch 2000; Welsh 1996; West 1998, Ake 1993). Because of household, ethnic and 
partisan politics, it is difficult for members of such groups to disown one of theirs in pursuit of 
distributive justice, which can only be realised by having a free and untied hand to social strata 
allegiances which, at best, creates societal schisms, socio-political and economic woes in the 
national context.  
Popular Theories regarding the Underdevelopment of African States 
Most political scientists still hold that the underdevelopment of African States results 
from such States’ lack of “capacity to design and implement policies, make credible 
commitments, run an efficient bureaucracy and provide constraints to opportunistic behaviour”, 
(Englebert 2000: 8). The latter assumption seems to receive wide acceptance not only in the 
imperial global north, but also among nation-state players in the global south. Such acceptance is 
seen in the manner in which countries in the global north not only run but create scenarios of 
want, to be able to play the saviour role to the poor – both mental and material poverty, in the 
global south.  
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 Refers to the World Bank (WB) 
67
 Refers to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
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Other theoretical perspectives are those which have received wide acceptance among 
government figures, scholars, and the civil society which claim that African States are 
underdeveloped as a result of “ethnic diversity [which has] led to social polarization and 
entrenched interest groups” (Englebert 2000: 9), and such weakness as seen in the African 
institutions results from inheriting “artificial polities from colonialism [and resorting] to neo-
patrimonial strategies” (Englebert 2000: 9), as a way to protect the interests of the ‘developed’ 
peasants (Fanon 2004; Englebert 2000; Mbembe 2001). The analysis of this topic would propose 
that the above theories are correct as theories, but cannot be taken as the final verdict on the 
topic. Modern day leaders in Africa, including those in Tanzania have more education and are 
able to make their policy-based decisions on the direction the governing class should take to 
ensure the security of the masses socio-politically and economically.  
It would appear that kinship and nepotistic attitudes play a big role in the Tanzanian 
politics. Kinship and partisan politics seem to be one of the main challenges, if not the primary 
challenge, confronting rational decision-making processes within the Tanzanian governing 
authorities. This has led to the current power dynamics, which in turn, promotes the silencing of 
voices within the Tanzanian State apparatuses and individual personnel who attempt to support 
and advocate for the welfare and equity in the distribution of revenues from the exploitation of 
natural/mineral resources. With an inclination to ‘territorial’ politics characterised by both 
kinship and partisan politics, the Tanzanian government has not been effective in prioritising the 
interests of the people of Tanzania. 
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Chapter 4 
The Canadian State and Its Contemporary ‘Trade’ 
Relations with Tanzania 
 
…the postcolonial relationship is not primarily a relationship of resistance or of collaboration but can 
best be characterised as illicit cohabitation, a relationship made fraught by the very fact of the 
commandement and its ‘subjects’ having to share the same living space. It is precisely this logic, the 
necessary familiarity and domesticity in the relationship that explains why there has not been […] the 
resistance or the accommodation, the disengagement or the ‘refusal to be captured’. 
(Mbembe 1992: 104) 
 
The previous two chapters have explored political and cultural factors contribute to 
shortcomings in leadership and governance structures in Tanzania. These factors seem to 
promote the apparent apathy in the Tanzanian government to address the needs of its citizenry. 
European colonial practices in collaboration with cultural leadership and governance structures 
as seen in Tanzania are essentially systems of appropriation and personal gratification. Critics 
suggest that the 1967 Arusha Declaration
68
 and subsequent social and economic strategies were 
only but a ‘façade’ of a government which was entrenched in colonial practices and merely 
interested in domination of the rest of the country’s populace. In principle the relationship 
between Tanzania and Canada has over the years been driven by 'benevolence'. However, it has 
distorted Tanzanian production systems and weakened Tanzanian government’s ability to attend 
to the social, economic needs of its citizenry. This chapter explores and examines the 
characteristics of the contemporary mineral-based trade relations between Tanzania and Canada. 
It will address the fundamental principles in the natural/mineral resource-based relationship 
between Tanzania and Canada. What are the economic impacts of Tanzania – Canada mineral-
based trade relations? What roles have the Canadian government and Canadian MMCs played in 
strengthening or weakening institutional and policy frameworks in Tanzania?     
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  See Chachage & Mbunda (2009), Igoe (2006), Mwaikusa (1993) 
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Characteristics of Trade Relations between Tanzania and Canada 
In the Colonial period, and in order to succeed in ‘assimilating’ Africans into a belief that 
they belonged to a German or British territory, the colonial powers formulated what could be 
termed as a common law to regulate land ownership. Starting with the Germans, and then later 
the British colonial periods, land rights and the sense of entitlement to the ancestral land by 
Tanzanians was lifted and in accordance to the “Imperial Land Ordinance of 1895 [all land was] 
vested as crown [property]” (Emel et al 2011: 74). Access and control of land was critical to 
accessing both arable and mineralised subsoil. According to earlier research findings, there were 
already seventy six (76) mineral prospecting fields identified and a hundred and eleven (111) 
claims as early as 1910  (Chachage 1995; Emel et al 2011).  
This trend was not abandoned when Tanzania became an independent state. The 
postcolonial Tanzanian State did not change the colonial articles which catalysed expropriation 
of land from its citizens, but carried out similar principles in the formulation and enactment of 
the 1969 Mining Ordinance which repealed the 1929 Mining Ordinance. It is stated in the 1969 
Mining Ordinance that, “The entire property in and control of all minerals in, under or upon any 
lands in Tanganyika are and shall be vested in the President
69” (URT 1969: 1). Similarly, the 
repealed Mining Act 1998 and the new Mining Act 2010 express the same principles on 
ownership of land and natural property control. However, these last two legislations have minor 
differences in the way they are written. The last parts where ownership and powers to control the 
use and disposal of land for domestic, investment or other uses, state, “subject to the provisions 
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 Even though the latter part of the Mining Act 2010 paints an imagery of the Head of State being responsible and 
answerable to the ‘republic’ on matters related to land and exploitation of such resources as found “on, in and under 
the land” (URT 2010), such allusion has no real effect in Tanzania, especially in the extractive or agribusiness 
sector. Due to this legislative structure relating to ownership and control of land and all mineral resources, the 
government of Tanzania or the representatives of the United Republic of Tanzania can appropriate land from its own 
citizens at any time and grant control to whomever it pleases. Colonial legislative ‘remnant’ positions such as that 
found in the Tanzanian case, are not peculiar to Tanzania. Mégret (2011), writing on mining in Burkina Faso, 
confirms further that most former colonies were subjected to the same imperialist mining ordinances. In the case of 
Burkina Faso, it is evident that the legislative position on land ownership coincided with land reforms implemented 
in 1984. The reforms gave “exclusive” land ownership rights to the State. Supporting this is Burkina Faso’s 2003 
Mining Code, Article 5, which expressly states that “Natural mineral substance deposits in the soil and subsoil of 
Burkina Faso are, by law, the property of the State” (Op. cit. pg 395).  
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of this Act the entire property and control over minerals on, in or under the land to which this 
Act applies is vested in the United Republic
70
 (URT 2010: 13).  
In the name of development, and economic progress, as indicated above the Canadian 
government as early as the 1970s was involved in alienation of vast tracts of land from 
Tanzanian community members through the Tanzania-Canada Wheat Complex (TCWC) project. 
Securing land for the TCWC project was facilitated by the government of the United Republic of 
Tanzania. Today, BGC/ABG – a Canadian multinational mining company (MMC) operating in 
Tanzania, claims to “own land” (Rubara 2008) in Tanzania. This ownership is not just for 
purposes of their immediate operations. Rather, they acquire land in excess, some of which is not 
put to use, while community members in the mining areas suffer great need for land (Chachage 
& Mbunda 2009; Rubara 2008; Chachage 2009). In this analysis, Greg Walker, the then (2008) 
general manager at Barrick Gold Corporation’s mine site at Kakola in Bulyanhulu is quoted as 
saying: 
We have been holding discussions with the government on whether the Kakola – 
Bulyanhulu residents should remain on the land where they are right now for a long time 
but until now we have not reached a consensus. Seeing what the people go through, we 
have decided to give them the land. Actually it is not yet theirs but we are finalising legal 
documents to finally hand over the land to Kakola people, (Rubara 2008). 
In both the case of the pastoral community in Hanan’g and in the operations in the 
extractive sector, the Canadian investment ventures in Tanzanian mining sector appear to follow 
the colonial methods of claiming local property rights, especially land ownership. Experientially, 
such rights are either granted through mineral exploration or mineral development agreements. 
Similarities could be drawn between the current system in Tanzania where investors in the 
extractive sector own land and that of the colonists; the legislative structures inherited from the 
colonial period remain unchanged. Leaving the major sectors in Tanzania, the agricultural and 
the extractive sectors under the control of the investor community replays the colonial methods 
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 Italics mine to show the difference between the earlier versions which either gave the rights of ownership and 
control of the natural resources to the “Crown” or the “President” as with the 1929 and 1969 Mining Ordinances. 
This alteration is important as it helps to recognise the sense of the representative role of governing authorities. 
However, this does not mean that the governing authorities are deterred from abusing their given positions for their 
own benefit at the expense of the people of Tanzania 
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of wealth accumulation where “institutional structure [served] metropolitan interests” (Gulhati 
1990: 1148). The relationship between the Canadian and Tanzanian governments appears to 
evidence ‘master-servant’ relationship paradigms. The Tanzanian government seems to be 
playing the role of providing “political and legal security [as well as offering] support to mining 
firms for acquiring and controlling the requisite [Tanzanian] labour” (AU & ECA 2011: 13). 
The Tanzania-Canada Relations Impact on Microeconomics  
Critics of governance structures of the Global South economies such as Tanzania have 
long argued that underdevelopment in the South results from different levels as well as different 
versions of corrupt practices (Cole et al 2004)
71
  within the governing class structures while the 
general population lives under deplorable conditions and abject poverty. Other analysts would go 
as far as suggesting that governance structures in the Global South, especially in Africa, are not 
stable – as they are characterised by the ‘survival of the fittest’ elements. Empirically, leaders 
who neither have confidence nor capacity in a profess that requires both, will succumb to 
opportunistic strategies to stay in such positions.   Indeed, African leaders are said to harbour 
personalistic objectives “to survive as rulers” (Gulhati 1990: 1148). This attitude towards 
leadership promotes nepotistic trends as well as corruption.  Another perspective presented when 
discussing the underdevelopment of nation-state governance structures in the Global South 
highlights the ‘lack of capacity and expertise’ among State actors in the Global South countries 
(AU & ECA 2011).  
A number of commentators have shown that Tanzania struggles with macroeconomic 
management. In fact, it has been described as facing “serious macroeconomic mismanagement” 
(MacDonald & Roe 2007: 7), along with governance deficiencies which characterise governance 
and development discourses in the Global South countries with regards to managing resources 
for sustainable development (MacDonald & Roe 2007; AU & ECA 2011). Such ‘comparative’ 
analysis is drawn from social and economic development indicators from the contexts where 
neoliberal capital economic methods have had significantly positive economic impact.  
                                                          
71
 The work conducted by Cole et al (2004) especially focuses on countries whose economies are dependent on FDIs 
with respect to creating pollution havens. Even though its main discussion is on the subject of corruption from an 
environmental politics perspective, this work is useful as it articulates the general perception of neoliberal capitalist 
system’s sociopolitical, economic and environmental critics on global north-south economic discourse dimensions.  
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Even though the 1962 UN Declaration of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural 
Resources
72
 stresses ‘sovereignty’ of countries to control and utilise natural resources for the 
benefit of their citizenry, the reality is the very opposite. It is apparent that affluent countries 
such as Canada still find ways to manipulate governance structures in underdeveloped 
‘sovereign’ postcolonial states, such as Tanzania, with the help of the IFIs, for their own 
economic gain. The sense of ‘sovereignty’ over natural resources invoked by the UN appears not 
to encourage group action against economically dominant countries; rather, it appears to 
encourage bilateral agreements which have characterised the mineral exploitation sectors 
globally. This analysis is descriptive of the relationship between the Tanzanian and Canadian 
governments.  
MacDonald & Roe (2007) write of the rapid growth of the mining sector in Tanzania 
since the mid-1990s and its ‘presumed’ contribution to the national economy. This report also 
claim that artisanal mining activities “contributed less to Tanzania’s employment and [to the 
gross domestic production (GDP)]” (Op. cit. pg. 7) compared to the contributions from large 
scale multinational mining operations. This study which looked at the economic contribution 
trends of the mining sector from 1996 to 2003 deplored the results as ‘below expectation’. 
Another report issued by the Religious Mother-bodies in Tanzania including Tanzania Episcopal 
Conference (TEC), Christian Council of Tanzania (CCT) and Baraza Kuu la Waislamu Tanzania 
(BAKWATA)
73
, which analysed revenues from the mining sector in Tanzania between 1997 and 
2005, reported revenue loss to Tanzania of up to $265.5 million “as a result of an excessively 
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 “In 1952, the General Assembly requested the Commission on Human Rights to prepare recommendations 
concerning international respect for the right of peoples to self-determination. The Commission on Human Rights 
recommended the establishment of a commission to conduct a full survey of the right of peoples and nations to 
permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources, having noted that this right formed a “basic 
constituent of the right to self-determination”. In accordance with this recommendation, the General Assembly 
established the United Nations Commission on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources on 12 December 
1958 under resolution 1314 (XIII). In 1961, this Commission adopted a draft resolution outlining principles 
concerning permanent sovereignty over natural resources. Following consideration of this draft resolution by the 
Economic and Social Council and the Second Committee of the General Assembly, the General Assembly adopted 
resolution 1803 (XVII). Resolution 1803 (XVII) provides that States and international organizations shall strictly 
and conscientiously respect the sovereignty of peoples and nations over their natural wealth and resources in 
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles contained in the resolution. These principles 
are set out in eight articles concerning, inter alia, the exploration, development and disposition of natural resources, 
nationalization and expropriation, foreign investment, the sharing of profits, and other related issues.” Accessed on 
April 11, 2014 at: http://legal.un.org/avl/ha/ga_1803/ga_1803.html  
73
 The National Muslim Council of Tanzania 
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low royalty rate, government tax concessions that allow companies to avoid paying corporation 
tax and possibly even tax evasion by some companies if allegations are true” (Lissu & Curtis 
2008: 7). Within the same period other reports suggested that Tanzania was making progress 
economically with indicators of significant contributions from the mining sector both at the 
national and grassroots levels.
74
  
The ‘Machiavellian’ Economic Partnership in Canada-Tanzania Relations  
Canadian MMCs interest and involvement in Tanzania go back to 1983. According to 
information on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE), Sutton Resources,
75
 the Canadian Mineral 
Exploration and Development Company based in Vancouver, British Columbia first listed its 
operations in Tanzania with TSE on June 8, 1983. Due to financial challenges and “trouble 
obtaining financing because of weak gold prices [Sutton Resources sold its business equity to 
Barrick Gold Corporation (BGC)] for about $350 million in stock” (NY Times 1999). This goes 
against the common belief that Canadian MMCs in Tanzania begun operating in Tanzania in 
mid-1990s.  
With the implementation of trade liberalisation policies after Tanzania became a member 
State at the World Trade Organisation (WTO) on January 1, 1995
76
; it witnessed an influx of 
interest from foreign investors (Igoe 2006; Lange & ESRF 2006; MacDonald & Roe 2007; 
Bourgouin 2011). Especially, after the formulation and enactment of the Tanzania Mineral 
Policy of 1997 and Mining Act of 1998 respectively, both of which allowed absolute foreign 
ownership (Bourgouin 2011; Mjimba 2011; Lange & ESRF 2006; MEM 2009). and 
multinational mining corporations (MMCs) became dominant forces in gold production At the 
inception of the SAPs in the 1970s, countries in the Global South were confronted by a number 
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 In his presentation in Vancouver, Canada in 2004, entitled “Impact Assessment and the Mining Industry: 
Perspectives from Tanzania”, Professor Raphael Mwalyosi writes that, “…mining sector has already recorded an 
impressive growth of around 17% a year between 1997 and 1999. Estimates show that mining will contribute more 
than $ 1 billion a year and contribute over 10% of the GDP […] the production of gold enabled the investors to pay 
taxes to the government to the tune of 47 billion Tanzania shillings by 2002, 17 times more than in 1997 [and] 
according to the observations by Tanzania’s Minister for Energy and Minerals recently, the Sector has not made any 
significant contribution to the alleviation of the country’s poverty”. This information was accessed at: 
http://www.tzonline.org/pdf/impactassessmentandtheminingindustry.pdf  
75
 Information accessed on May 14, 2014 at: 
(http://www.tmx.com/TSXVenture/TSXVentureHttpController?GetPage=CompanySummary&PO_ID=38311&HC
_FLAG1=Y). 
76
 Information accessed at: http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/tanzania_e.htm  
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of conditions prescribed by the Bretton Woods System (that is to say the Bank and the Fund) 
before ‘development’ funds disbursement could be effected.  
Privatisation and trade liberalisation policies acted as ‘connectors’ between the elite 
community made up of the international organisations, political and administrative leaders from 
Tanzania and Canada as well as the executives from the MNCs. Notably, the influx of FDIs into 
Tanzania did not just attract investors from the Global North but also from the Global South, 
especially from South Africa. Although there was already South African involvement through de 
Beers in the operations of Williamsons Diamond in Mwadui – Shinyanga since the 1930s,77 it is 
clear that “Tanzania became the leading recipient of South African investment capital in 1998, 
with FDI topping about US$443 million” (Kabelwa 2002: 2). Although this reception of FDI 
from South Africa could be read as a way for Tanzania to show support to the process of ending 
apartheid
78
 in South Africa, it also coincided with the major changes that were taking place in 
Tanzania with respect to trade liberalisation policies that were sweeping across the globe starting 
in the early 1990s (Kabelwa 2002). Between the year 1994 and 2002 when South African FDI to 
Tanzania became significant, a total of 59 South African operations were registered. These 
operations were cross-sectoral and were actively involved in mining, security services, 
manufacturing, tourism, petroleum, services, construction, and agriculture (Kabelwa 2002).  
Even with such mineral concessions granted to foreign MMCs including non-restrictive 
tax regimes, imposing of fiscal incentives among etc. the relationship between the 
representatives of the MNCs and the government actors and others in the business promotion 
sectors remained selective. Within such social and professional groups, there are those who are 
pro-mining as well as those who are against mining operations. The mining/extractive sector 
became a peculiar case for contestation. Having in mind that structural reforms in Tanzania were 
                                                          
77
 The Williamson diamond mine is operated and owned by De Beers [75%] and the Tanzanian government. The 
Mwadui kimberlite was one of the world’s largest producing kimberlite pipes. The mine has been in operation since 
the 1930’s and has produced as much as 2Mct. From 1940 – 1970, Williamson Diamonds undertook an extensive 
exploration program covering nearly all of Tanzania. More than 300 kimberlite pipes were found, of which 60 were 
found to be diamondiferous. Information accessed at: http://www.mbendi.com/indy/ming/dmnd/af/ta/p0005.htm 
78
 Sanctions against this regime prevented South African companies from investing their profits abroad. The 
adoption of a democratic regime in 1994, however, released this previously dormant investment capacity. Since 
then, South Africa became the major source of foreign direct investment (FDI) in many African countries (Kabelwa 
2002: 4) 
56 | P a g e :  E R u b a r a _ M E S :  M R P _ C o - O p t e d .  © 2 0 1 4  
 
acceded to by way of ‘compromise’79 (Bourgouin 2011) between the governing authorities, the 
TNCs and the Bank, the extractive industry, as a prime economic and investment sector in 
Tanzania, immediately attracted competing forces. Such forces were formed with business 
ideologies, institutional and legal frameworks on the one hand and ‘Machiavellian’ trends on the 
other. 
The first item, it seems, on the list to be discussed once the structural economic reforms 
proposals were ratified by the Bank, the Fund and Tanzanian government in 1995 was the role of 
the State apparatus. Similar to other countries which previously accepted the development 
conditions from the bank and the Fund, the role of Tanzanian government was reduced to that of 
legitimising presence of FDIs and providers of security to the interests of foreign investments 
(Bourgouin 2011; MEM 2009; Mjimbwa 2011; Emel et al 2009; Mégret 2011; Szablowski 2007; 
Gordon 2010). That is to say, the role of the Tanzanian State was ‘redefined’ (Campbell ed 
2004). Besides the views of the scholars cited above, it would be plausible to suggest that this 
“redefinition” of State apparatus role, is in fact, the reinstatement of imperialistic principles. 
Local people in leadership in the colonial period in Africa were allowed positions of authority 
only for strategic purposes, i.e. to act as agents of the colonial powers.   
Relationships between the governments, mining companies’ executives and corporate 
promotion agencies became more obvious in the business bidding process in pursuit of 
prospecting and mining licence issuance. One such instance depicts the Canadian government 
through its diplomatic mission in Tanzania lobbying for Sutton Resources’ operational interests 
in Tanzania (Lissu 2001; Kerr & Holloway 2002). According to the reports published on 
Canada’s interest in the mining sector in Tanzania in 1996, it was reported that while Canadian 
TNCs executives lobbied their stakeholders to consider investing in the Tanzanian mining sector 
in the wake of the trade liberalisation policies implementation, “the Canadian government threw 
its weight behind [Sutton Resources’] management to convince the Tanzanian government to 
remove the [artisanal] miners” (Kerr & Holloway 2002: 4).  
                                                          
79
 As for the saying ‘history repeats itself’, the proposals for new agricultural projects were proposed to the 
Tanzanian government at a time of need. Canada’s proposal for the TCWC project came at a time when Tanzania 
“was attempting to qualify for the World Bank’s [Highly Indebted Poor Countries] HIPC [whose] conditionality 
included macroeconomic reforms”, (Butler in Campbell ed 2004: 70) 
57 | P a g e :  E R u b a r a _ M E S :  M R P _ C o - O p t e d .  © 2 0 1 4  
 
Excerpts from correspondence between the Canadian High Commissioner at the time, 
Verona Edelstein’s office, and Ottawa concerning the transfer of ownership of the Kahama 
Mining Corporation Ltd. (KMCL) equity from Sutton Resources to Barrick Gold Corporation
80
 
(ABG/BGC) predicted that the “Tanzanian Government will be clearing mining site of illegal 
miners beginning 20 of May [1996]” (Kerr & Holloway 2002: 5). The transition of management 
of KMCL operations from Sutton Resources to BCG was documented to have been characterised 
by gross human rights violations.  Reports
81
 from various sources, such as Mines and 
Communities
82
 (MAC 2001), Palast
83
 (2003), Glynn
84
 (2006), Mining Watch Canada
85
 (2002), 
Conason
86
 (2001) to mention a few, reported that over 50 artisanal miners died as a result of 
being buried alive in the artisanal mining shafts. This happened when Barrick Gold Corporation 
BGC was backfilling the shafts within its newly acquired KMCL property in 1996. This was part 
of the exercise aimed at clearing ‘illegal miners’ (Lissu 2001; Kerr & Holloway 2002; Palast 
2003).  
The Canadian government came once again under the spotlight in 2008 when the most 
recent mining legislation (Mining Act 2010) was being tabled in the Tanzanian Bunge.
87
 It was 
                                                          
80
 Barrick Gold Corporation (BGC) has since February 2010 changed its name to African Barrick Gold (ABG). 
According to the information on their Annual Report (foreign private issuer)) Filed 03/28/13 for the Period Ending 
12/31/12, pg. 23 states that “Barrick no longer has an African [Regional Business Unit] RBU; however, for 
reporting purposes [African Barrick Gold] ABG continues to be treated as an operating segment within Barrick. 
Barrick currently holds a 73.9% equity interest in ABG. The assets, liabilities, operating results and cash flows of 
ABG are consolidated by Barrick. ABG’s operations consist of its Bulyanhulu mine, its 70% interest in the 
Tulawaka mine, its North Mara mine and its Buzwagi mine, all located in Tanzania”. Information accessed at: 
http://www.barrick.com/files/agm/Barrick-40F-2012.pdf  
81
 The reports cited above record the number of artisanal miners who were buried alive as between 50 and 52, 
empirical evidence and accounts from local people (and from my personal experience working with communities in 
the mining areas in Tanzania) suggests a higher number – over 70 artisanal miners buried alive in the mining shafts 
in the clearance exercise by BGC. The latter claims are difficult to prove as the recommendation by Judge Mark 
Bomani for an independent investigation in 2002 (Kerr & Holloway 2002; IRIN News
81
 2002) ‘fell’ on deaf ears. 
This situation was later blamed on pressure and intimidation from foreign and local (Canadian/Tanzanian 
governments and the Canadian MNCs executives) players which led to the judicial repression which characterised 
the whole process (Lissu 2001; Kerr & Holloway 2002; Simbeye 2002
81
). Apart from the reports of human rights 
violations and forced killings, the take-over of the Bulyanhulu gold fields also led to the loss of means of livelihood 
for at least 400,000 Tanzanians whose lives depended on artisanal mining activities (Lissu & Curtis 2008).  
82
 “Buried Alive? The Bulyanhulu accusations”: http://www.minesandcommunities.org/article.php?a=430  
83
 “The Truth Buried Alive”: http://www.utne.com/community/the-truth-buried-alive.aspx  
84
 "There is Death in them thar' Pits": Canada's Barrick Gold in Tanzania: 
http://www.dominionpaper.ca/features/2006/07/05/there_is_d.html  
85
 “Report of the International NGO Fact-finding Mission to Tanzania”: http://www.miningwatch.ca/report-
international-ngo-fact-finding-mission-tanzania  
86
 “Exporting Corporate Control: A Gold Company with Ties to the Bush Family Tries to Muzzle a Muckraking 
Journalist”: Common Dreams: http://www.commondreams.org/views01/0721-08.htm 
87
 The Parliament 
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reported that the then Canadian High Commissioner to Tanzania, Janet Siddall, accompanied by 
“a high-level Canadian delegation” (Simbeye 200888) paid a visit to the Tanzanian Parliament in 
an “attempt to influence” (ThisDay 2008) concluding discussions on the amendments 
recommended after the probe by the The Presidential Mining Review Committee (PMRC), also 
known as the Bomani Commission. Among other recommendations, the Bomani Commission 
recommended that the government of Tanzania needs to: 
- motivate its citizens or “villages owning license to come into share with [multinational] 
investors so as to benefit from the income than selling their land” (URT 2008: 100) 
- increase the “value of royalty in diamond and unprocessed gemstones to rise from 5% to 
7% and for the processed to rise from 0% to 3%” (URT 2008: 102) 
- increase the royalty for metallic minerals like Gold , silver and copper to be elevate from 
3% to 5% (URT 2008: 102) 
- enact into law and require MMCs “to pay withholding tax during the interest payment 
done to related parties” (URT 2008: 105) 
 
The Bomani Commission report
89
 also highlighted poor relations between the MMCs and 
local communities in the mining areas, environmental pollution by the MMCs, conflicts between 
MMCs
90
 and artisanal miners and mine workers. As well, the Bomani Commission report 
highlighted lack of linkages between the extractive sector and other social and economic sectors 
in Tanzania. Lack of public awareness of mining activities as relating to the sector’s social, 
environmental, economic, and political impact was also prominent. The Bomani Commission 
report attributed all this to “weakness in the mining [sector’s] oversight system and in the legal 
system” (URT 2008: 28).  
                                                          
88
 “Time for multinational mining companies to pay real taxes”: Finigan Wa Simbeye, July 21, 2008; Information 
accessed at: http://www.sapphirecapital.proboards.com/thread/650 
89
 In this research, the translated “popular” version of the Bomani Commission’s Report published by Policy Forum 
is used. This version was accessed on April 23, 2013 at: http://www.policyforum-
tz.org/files/BomaniReportEnglish.pdf  
90
 Even though Tanzania the mining sector in Tanzania have attracted many investors from countries like Australia, 
Britain, South Africa etc. the PMRC highlighted poor relations between Barrick Gold Corporation and communities 
in the areas of their operations such as Bulyanhulu, North Mara and Buzwagi. 
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In his article, Wa Simbeye (2008) says that this delegation was meant “to lobby 
lawmakers on delaying or altogether rejecting some of the most constructive proposals made by 
a presidential mining sector review committee”.  
The Bomani Commission report (URT 2008) also indicated that the emergence of 
neoliberal resource exploitation activities in Tanzania, including those of Canadian MMCs, such 
as Sutton Resources and Barrick Gold Corporation took advantage of departments within the 
Bank such as the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) and the Multilateral 
Agreement on Investment (MAI). Both of which made it difficult for a poor country like 
Tanzania to negotiate a better economic deal for its people (Lissu 2001).  
On May 16, 2013 Canada and Tanzania entered the Foreign Investment Promotion and 
Protection Agreement (FIPA). This agreement has been viewed by critics as another form of the 
1999 proposed – but dismissed in analysing the signing of the FIPA between the Tanzanian and 
Canadian governments, Butler & Rubara (2013) perceive this step as a strategy “to protect 
Canadian investments in Tanzania [as well as a strategy to limit future] possibilities for Tanzania 
to introduce policies that will protect and favour domestic businesses and Tanzanian citizens 
against aggressive foreign competition”.91 Such agreements as FIPA are only advantageous for 
the Canadian government.
92
 It is not yet clear why the Tanzanian government made the decision 
in signing this document while there is a backlog of social, environmental and economic related 
to the mineral-based trade relations to be dealt with between Tanzania, Canada and Canadian 
MMCs.  
In their analysis on Tanzania-Canada FIPA, Butler & Rubara (2013) describe the 
Canadian attitude as featuring “all the now-classic elements of a neo-liberalized investment 
regime designed to favour and benefit transnational business”. This is reminiscent of the Marxist 
theory of instrumentalisation through strategic policy influence “to [support] status quo that 
                                                          
91
 “Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreements (FIPAs)”: Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development 
Canada; Accessed at: http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/fipa-
apie/index.aspx?lang=eng 
92 The Canadian government is busy negotiating similar agreements with other countries. Online records from 
Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada show that between 1991 and 2014 the Canadian government has 
engaged 51 countries in the FIPAs. Out of the 51 countries, “27 FIPAs are in force, 3 FIPAs signed, 10 concluded 
FIPAs negotiations, and 11ongoing FIPAs negotiations”. Accessed online on “Foreign Affairs, Trade and 
Development Canada” website at: http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-
acc/fipa-apie/index.aspx?lang=eng 
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undermines accountability and democratization” (Tripp 2012 – Abstract).  On his part, Gordon 
(2010) suggests that wealth accumulation trends adopted by the Canadian government in its 
relationship with countries in the third world under the guise of ‘the promotion and reciprocal 
protection of investments’ is imperialistic. He says further that the character of Canada is that of 
a “country [which] actively participates in the global system of domination in which the wealth 
and resources of the third world are systematically plundered by capital of the global north” 
(Gordon 2010: 9).  
Canadian MMCs’ ‘Parasitic’93 Business Trends in Tanzania  
The analysis on the nature of the relationship between the Canadian and Tanzanian 
governments at the State level clearly shows unequal trade “cohabitation” (Mbembe 1992) is 
founded on colonial structures and perpetuates colonial principles characterised by satellite-
metropolis ideologies.  
Lack of public awareness on the impacts of MMCs’ activities as identified by the Bomani 
Commission (URT 2008), and lack of political will, on the part of the Tanzanian State apparatus, 
could be seen as loopholes taken advantage of by the Canadian MMCs to further the 
imperialistic pillage of resources from Tanzania. The Canadian MMCs involvement could be 
described as parasitic in nature. Apart from this parasitic attitude, the Canadian MMCs operating 
in Tanzania, especially African Barrick Gold (ABG), is reported to engage in lobbying the 
government of the Tanzanian government at different times and in different ways. Greg Walker, 
the then (2008) ABG’s general manager at its Kahama Mining Company Ltd. (KMCL) 
operations in Bulyanhulu stated: “[ABG] has been in dialogue with the government on a number 
of the newly proposed policies on mining. There are those which are harsh to an operation like 
ours and we have asked them to review them if at all we are going to help Tanzania make 
economic advancement from mining activities” (Rubara 2008). 
The attitude evidenced by the Canadian MMCs is far from being exclusive to Tanzania 
and other mineral rich countries in the Global South contexts. Canadian MMCs are also reported 
                                                          
93
 I employ the term ‘parasitic’ in this context to show that Canadian MMCs, especially in relation to ABG/BGC 
operations in Tanzania, while opportunistic, seems to flourish at the expense of local community members. The 
deaths and the blood of local community members seem to be ABG/BGC’s economic fertiliser. 
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to practice the same ‘parasitic’ culture within Canada.94 Any self-determining policies related to 
the rights of the indigenous people are seen as an impediment for mineral exploitation. In this 
Globe and Mail report, MMC in Canada called for “a more favourable tax regime, better 
cooperation between Provincial and Federal governments [and] a more streamlined and 
standardised process for dealing with the government’s duty to consult [and attend to] the 
concerns of the Aboriginal and other communities”.95 As would be expected and similar to other 
postcolonies, it is the responsibility of the State to deal with rights relating to the local 
community members. In the Tanzanian context where governance structures have been declared 
weak, the MMCs have smooth sailing and have dealings only with senior ministerial officials, 
the Head of the State, and when it suits their needs, with selected individuals who have the ears 
of the man at the top. 
Mineral-based trade relations strategy employed by the Canadian government and its 
MMCs in Tanzania, and perhaps other countries in Africa and elsewhere in ‘the global’96 and 
Global South countries evidences a “a neo-liberal subject who operates in a contemporary zone 
of neocolonialist power relations […] situated in a web of unresolved historical trauma 
associated with colonial and racial violence” (Butler 2014: 87, 92). And just as it was with the 
Tanzania-Canada Wheat Complex (TCWC) project in 1970s, so it seems in the neoliberal 
mineral-based trade relationships between Tanzania and Canada. In the Tanzanian experience, 
Canadian benevolence is a self-serving – economic raw deal accompanied by social, 
environmental and economic injustices. 
 
                                                          
94
 For example, advocates for mining activities in the native territories in Canada recently suggested that 
consultative approaches are a ‘waste’ of time. In a seemingly ‘arrogant’ extrapolation published by the Globe and 
Mail, the Canadian MMCs community expressed how “building and operating the complex mines that contributed 
$52 billion in GDP to Canada’s economy in 2012 is a relatively straightforward task compared to the heavy lifting 
often required to navigate the [mining] industry’s regulatory regime and cope with challenges such as Aboriginal 
consultation “Miners Call for Further Reforms: Sector Sees Regulatory Improvements but want More Cuts to Red 
Tape”; Globe and Mail, Special [Report]; Monday, March 3, 2014 Issue, IM1. 
95
 “Miners Call for Further Reforms: Sector Sees Regulatory Improvements but want More Cuts to Red Tape”; 
Globe and Mail, Special [Report]; Monday, March 3, 2014 Issue, IM3. 
96
 I am using this term in inverted commas to identify mid-range economy countries which even though poor when 
compared to developed countries in North America and Europe and elsewhere, their (countries such as China, Costa 
Rica, Venezuela, Argentina, Egypt etc.) poverty levels cannot be compared to that in many countries in the Global 
South (without inverted commas).  
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Chapter 5 
The Neoliberal ‘Pomposity’ & Its Realities in Tanzania 
 
 [Tanzania is] faced with a choice: Either to resist change and be swept aside by that massive wave 
and continue to be tossed around on the margins of global development in the 21st century; or to 
rapidly change our policies, administrative practices and our thinking in order to devise means and 
strategies to enable us to benefit from this new system of global relations. 
(Benjamin Mkapa’s97 May Day 2001 Speech Excerpt in Lissu 2001: 51)  
 
The previous chapters have highlighted the historical sociopolitical and some of the 
economic factors instrumental for the apparent apathy within leadership and governance 
structures in Tanzania. Contrary to the expectations of the people of Tanzania created by the 
enunciation of the emergence of the neoliberal era in Tanzania in 1995, the neoliberal 
development forecast has deepened poverty and a sense of dejection among community members 
in the mining areas. This chapter gives a historical snapshot of community based mineral 
exploitation and highlights social, economic, environmental and political realities of neoliberal 
mineral-based trade relations between Tanzania, Canada and Canadian MMCs. 
Rural Communities and Mining Activities in Tanzania 
Contemporary artisanal small-scale mining activities were recognised in Tanzania since 
1960s (Chachage 1995). These activities developed rapidly and coincided with the rise in gold 
prices in the 1970s (Lissu 2001). Artisanal mining activities started in Bulyanhulu goldfields in 
Kahama District much earlier, later to be joined by similar activities in North Mara area in 1980s 
(Lange 2008(2); Spiegel 2012). At this stage, artisanal mining served as secondary livelihood 
activity (Kitula 2006; MacDonald & Roe 2007). Subsistence farming was the primary livelihood, 
and still is among the majority of Tanzanian rural communities. However, in the 1980s and 
coinciding with the end of state monopoly of the mining sector (Spiegel 2012), the Tanzanian 
                                                          
97
 Benjamin William Mkapa was the Third Phase Head of State in the ‘postcolonial’ Government of the United 
Republic of Tanzania  
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government encouraged artisanal mining and even formalised the artisanal mining sector
98
. As 
such, artisanal mining was recognised as part of the national social and economic growth (Lissu 
2001; Spiegel 2012; Mutagwaba et al 1997). Many people from the Tanzanian rural setting 
joined in artisanal mining as a “sub-sector for their livelihood and poverty reduction efforts” 
(Scoble et al 2007).  
Artisanal mining is labour intensive. But records show that between 1980 and 1995 
artisanal mining sector employed between 400,000 and 1.5 million people
99
 (Chachage 1995; 
Lissu 2001; Lange & ESRF 2006; Scoble et al 2007; Kerr & Holloway 2002; Scoble et al 2007).  
Those who carried out artisanal mining activities were mainly from the rural areas in Tanzania. 
Other research states that “officially, there were 1,440 small scale claim holders and 480 
prospecting certificate holders in 1993, [and] at a very conservative estimate of 10,000 people 
per site, there were about 900,000 people involved in small scale mining and auxiliary activities” 
(Chachage 1995: 6). However, the increase in the artisanal mining activities between the mid-
1980s and mid-1990s in North Mara and Bulyanhulu was accompanied by an influx of 
population as well as “a variety of economic and socio-cultural activities, and agricultural 
production changed to respond to the new needs created” (Lissu 2001: 29).  
In recognising growth and the contribution of artisanal mining activities to the national 
economy, the government of Tanzania under Ujamaa policies enacted both the Gemstone 
Industry (Development and Promotion) Act in 1967 and the 1979 Mining Act (Chachage 1995) 
to protect artisanal mining sector as well as secure government revenues. The government 
established structures which allowed local miners to sell their gold to state authorities through 
the Bank of Tanzania (BoT) (Chachage 1995). In the arrangement, artisanal miners were paid 
and taxed accordingly. As they dealt with BoT directly on the sale of artisanally-produced gold 
                                                          
98
 According to Spiegel (2012), “The government’s Small-Scale Mining Policy Paper of 1983 encouraged citizens to 
supplement their incomes by participating in mining activities. In the 1990s, the government developed a legal and 
policy framework for formally integrating small-scale mining into a national mineral development strategy, 
introducing the Tanzanian Mining Policy of 1997 and the Mining Act of 1998, components of a mining policy 
reform process that was supported by the World Bank. Among other policy aims, the reforms included the aim of 
legalizing and formalizing the small-scale mining sector by establishing a suite of basic environmental and safety 
standards for ASGM along with a new permitting system”, (Spiegel 2012: 5). 
99
 Accurate statistics on how many people were directly employed in the artisanal mining activities in Tanzania 
between 1980 and 1995 is not available. But taking into consideration that over 400,000 people were directly 
employed at the Bulyanhulu artisanal mining fields alone (Lissu 2001; Kerr & Holloway 2002; Lissu & Curtis 
2008), the number could be higher when other areas are added up.  
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and other precious stones and metals, the government could not be said to have experienced tax 
evasion. There was, in effect, a productive partnership between peasant miners and the State. The 
1979 Mining Act required applicants for both prospecting and mining licenses to present a plan 
for the employment and training of Tanzanians, as well as for local procurement of goods and 
services. However, such requirements became obsolete at the time Tanzania joined the WTO in 
1995. Since industrial mining was much less labour-intensive than artisanal mining, and due to 
lack of modern skills and education commensurate with requirements of the modern mining 
among rural populace, peasant miners lost their artisanal mining sites. As well, the appropriation 
of vast tracts of ancestral land from local community members in these areas affected the 
agricultural sector significantly. The Mkapa administration acknowledged the contribution of 
artisanal – small-scale miners in the “discovery of the mineral occurrences, mineral production 
and creation of employments and creation of incomes in the rural communities” (URT 1997: 15). 
Subsequently, the government of Tanzania, through the Mineral Policy of 1997 ‘promised’ the 
creation of an enabling environment for artisanal miners in the Policy’s (URT1997: 15, 16 #3.3.6 
i-vii).  
But in the wake of multinational large-scale mining in Tanzania, the MMCs claimed that 
within a very short time it contributed “almost 4% of total tax revenues and over 3% of total 
domestic budget revenues [which is] not insubstantial contribution [as compared to] “almost 
nothing” from the artisanal mining activities (MacDonald & Roe 2007: 10). Other research 
findings contradict this postulation by MacDonald & Roe (2007) as it concludes that artisanal 
mining in Tanzania provided more direct employment opportunities to rural Tanzanian citizens, 
(Chachage 1995), especially women who accounted for “30% to 50%” (Scoble et al 2007: 6) of 
the workforce, than large scale mining activities. Chachage (1995) writes that “Tanzania was 
hardly gaining anything from their [MMCs] “operations”. It was the small scale miners who 
remained [as] the major foreign exchange earners up to the second half of the 1990s” (Op cit. pg. 
7). Another report commissioned by FBOs in Tanzania documented evidence which stated that 
large scale mining created around 10,000 jobs between 1997 and 2007 compared to the artisanal 
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mining sector which employed between 500,000 and 1.5m people. It concludes that “large scale 
mining may have made around 400,000
100
 people unemployed” (Lissu & Curtis 2008: 9). 
In the documentary film titled “A Golden Opportunity?”101 local community members 
recount how Tanzania’s third phase government under the Mkapa administration promised them 
that they “would ensure that there is partnership between artisanal miners and MMCs”. As 
already indicated from the excerpt of Mkapa’s address to Africa Gem Resources (AFGEM) 
meeting in 2001, the highlights of anticipated prosperity in welcoming large scale miners in 
Tanzania’s mining sector set a high tone of hope.  
This promise did not materialise. The adverse social, economic and environmental 
impacts in Tanzania resulting from the Canadian MMCs’ operations have received wide 
coverage in the contemporary news as well as countless professional and academic research. 
Mkapa’s speech highlighted the ‘new’ economic dynamic, the desire not to be left behind and the 
urgency to catch up with the rest of the world economically. In his speech, Mkapa urged 
Tanzanians to emulate the rest of the world and called upon Tanzanians to change. In this Mkapa 
made an urgent appeal for Tanzanians to join the rest of the world in “creating conducive policy, 
administrative and legal environment” with a warning of possibilities to “reduce [Tanzania’s] 
attraction
102
 to investors” (Mkapa in Lissu 2001: 51). The ‘new’ economic dynamic introduced 
through the implementation of the neoliberal capital market-led economic system, required land.  
 According to Lissu (2001), “in June 1995 [and] on the on the basis of [Prospecting 
Licence] PL 216/94, KMCL commenced legal proceedings in the High Court of Tanzania 
against small-scale miners [operating at the Bulyanhulu gold fields] seeking to evict them…” 
(Op. cit.) As would be expected, this became a battle of ownership between the artisanal miners 
and KMCL. Even though the justice system in Tanzania is said to have identified flaws in the 
transaction pitting the artisanal miners and Canadian Sutton Resources, in his verdict Judge 
Mchome found no “provision made for compensation and/or resettlement of the indigenous 
                                                          
100
 It is proper to emphasise that this estimate only accounts for the number of artisanal miners evicted from the 
Kakola – Bulyanhulu area artisanal gold mining fields in 1996. Going by the initial estimates, it is possible that the 
number might be higher than this estimate given by Lissu & Curtis (2008), Lange & ESRF (2006) etc. 
101
 “A Golden Opportunity?”, (at 17m: 50 Sec – 18 m: 02Sec); Accessed on June 17, 2014 at: 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eaY0hIqnIh0  
102
 Italics mine 
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people” (Lissu 2001: 31); the process of clearing artisanal miners proceeded (Lissu 2001; Kerr & 
Holloway 2002).  
Even though artisanal miners were initially made to believe that there would be joint 
ventures between their activities and those of the Canadian Barrick Gold Corporation (BGC), by 
Mkapa’s administration, proved futile, if not utopian. The mineral policy reform process was 
figuratively depicted by Mkapa (in Lissu 2001) as ‘bitter medicine which stands between cure 
and death’ (Op. cit.). The results of this figurative speech became more evident as Canadian 
MMCs established their operations in Tanzania.  
Canadian MMCs in Tanzania: Socio-environmental Impacts (Kahama and North 
Mara) 
The Canadian MMCs from the beginning of large scale gold mining in Tanzania have 
‘stolen’ the limelight in social, economic and environmental injustices. These are related to 
reports of high levels of gross human rights violations in their mining operations within the 
Tanzanian mining sector (Lissu 2001; Kerr & Holloway 2002; Lissu & Curtis 2008; Bitala et al 
2009
103
). The first incident of brutality leading to deaths of local community members was 
reported during the takeover exercise of the KMCL mining area from the artisanal miners in 
1996 at Bulyahulu, which ultimately spurred an international outcry.  
Bulyanhulu Mine Incidents 
Date Incident 
Aug. 5, 1994 Sutton Resources granted prospecting license for KMCL mining area in Bulyanhulu 
Sept.1994 Barrick Gold Corporation lays claim over KCML licenced area in Bulyanhulu 
June 1995 Barrick Gold Corporation lodges application asking eviction of Artisanal miners 
Sept. 29, 1995 High Court of Tanzania rejects Barrick Gold Corporation application for evictions 
Oct. 9, 1995 Barrick Gold Corporation appeals against High Court’s decision  
May 22, 1996 Barrick Gold Corporation withdraws its lodged appeal against High Court’s decision 
July 30, 1996 The government of the United republic of Tanzania orders eviction of artisanal miners 
Aug. 2, 1996 Artisanal miners challenges the order to vacate Bulyanhulu area 
Aug. 12, 1996 Media reports on 23 artisanal miners feared dead by being buried alive
104
 
Aug. 13, 1996 Media reports on 52 artisanal miners dead on claims of being buried alive
105
 
August 2000 MIGA provides $172 million guarantee for Barrick Gold Corporation’s KMCL project 
March 2002 International Fact-finding Mission visits Bulyanhulu but denied access
106
 
                                                          
103
 Bitala et al 2009: “Report Reveals North Mara Gold Mine Pollution”; Pambazuka News, Issue 450. Accessed on 
March 10, 2014 at: http://pambazuka.org/en/category/features/59161  
104
 A. Swilla, ‘23 feared buried by 'graders' in Bulyankulu’ Majira Newspapers, Monday, August 12, 1996 issue. 
105
 M. Islam and M. Rweyemamu, ‘Uncertainty reigns over the Kahama Killings: The number of those dead in the 
mines feared to reach 52: Photos of the dead sent to Dodoma: They were allegedly buried by graders’, Mtanzania 
Newspapers, Tuesday, August 13, 1996 issue. 
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The Bulyanhulu and North Mara cases are particularly egregious example of human 
rights violations associated with Canadian mining in Tanzania. This case gained particular 
attention because of reports that artisanal miners and local residents were buried alive. Excerpts 
from different reports give accounts by survivors from the incidents that followed in the incident 
that left over fifty artisanal miners dead by being buried alive in the artisanal mining shafts. 
These deaths were reported to have occurred at the nine artisanal mining ‘centres’, referred to as 
“No. 1, No. 2, No. 3, No. 9, Bariadi, Kabare, Mabagikulu, Kakola Proper and Bushing’we. Of all 
the centres, the first two were known to produce the most gold. It is there that it is feared most 
victims of the eviction order are buried”.107 
 
Figure 5: Location of African Barrick Gold's Kahama Mining Corporation Ltd. (KMCL) in Kakola – Bulyanhulu. 
Source: http://www.infomine.com/index/properties/Bulyanhulu.html 
 
 
Among them is Melania Baesi whose narration has been documented in a short 
documentary film titled “A Golden Opportunity”.108 In the narratives as well as in Lissu (2001), 
artisanal miners were given conflicting information on the dates they were to vacate the 
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 Information accessed at: http://www.miningwatch.ca/report-international-ngo-fact-finding-mission-tanzania  
107
 Lissu 2001: 33 recorded from an article written by A. Mbogora, titled, “The day hell broke loose at Bulyanhulu”, 
The Guardian, Monday, September 9, 1996 issue.  
108
 This documentary film was produced jointly by the Christian Council of Tanzania (CCT), Tanzania Episcopal 
Conference (TEC) and the Muslim Council of of Tanzania. It is accessible on Youtube at: 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eaY0hIqnIh0  
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Bulyanhulu gold fields. According to the correspondence between the Compliance 
Advisor/Ombudsman (CAO) at the World Bank: 
On July 30, 1996, the Tanzanian government issued orders that the Bulyanhulu 
complainants should vacate the lands, settlements and property within 24 hours. 
Paramilitary police and demolition equipment belonging to the project sponsors [referred 
to earlier in the 13 page of the correspondence as Barrick Gold Corporation of Toronto, 
Canada (“the project sponsors”)] and operated by their employees were then situated in 
the Bulyanhulu complainants’ villages and settlements109 (CAO 2002: 14E). 
From the statement above, the government of Tanzania and Barrick Gold Corporation, 
referred to in the statement as “the project sponsor”, collaborated in this fatal exercise which led 
to the death of 50+ artisanal miners.  
Reports of brutality on community members and seeming avoidable deaths of local 
community members in the mining areas where Canadian MMCs, especially ABG/BGC operate, 
did not stop with what could rightly be called ‘Bulyanhulu Massacres’. The documentary 
evidence includes reports shooting and continuous killing of local community members in North 
Mars. Various contemporaneous online newsfeeds and mainstream media reported that in 2010 
at least three people were shot dead by ABG/BGC security personnel and 15 others “seriously 
wounded”.110 In June 2011, it was widely reported that the community members around NMGM 
clashed with security personnel at the mine waste site. A number of newspapers were dominated 
by headlines which read “Seven dead in clash at African Barrick mine”,111 “Gold mine saga sign 
of things to come”112 and “In an African mine, the lust for gold sparks a deadly clash”.113 On 
June 7, it was reported that ABG/BGC security personnel fired live bullets at unarmed waste-
                                                          
109
 Information accessed at: http://www.cao-ombudsman.org/cases/document-
links/documents/bulyfinal.Englishpdf.pdf  
110
 Information accessed on June 18, 2014 at: http://www.vijana.fm/2010/12/23/shooting-gold-diggers/; 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-12-23/shooting-gold-diggers-at-african-mine-seen-amid-record-prices.html  
111
 Lisa Wright in Toronto and Jocelyn Edwards in Tanzania 2011: The Star Business, Tuesday, May 17, 2011; 
Accessed on June 18, 2014 at: 
http://www.thestar.com/business/2011/05/17/seven_dead_in_clash_at_african_barrick_mine.html  
112
 Mobhare Matinyi, The Citizen - TANZANIA June 2nd, 2011: Accessed on June 18, 2014 at: 
http://www.protestbarrick.net/article.php?id=749   
113
 Geoffrey York 2011: Globe and Mail, North Mara, TANZANIA, Tuesday, June 7, 2011; Accessed on June 18, 
2014 at:  
 http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/in-an-african-mine-the-lust-for-gold-sparks-a-deadly-
clash/article598554/  
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rock gleaners leaving the site (Globe and Mail Op. cit.; Butler 2014; Pike 2012). The Toronto-
based Toronto Star reported in its business section that: 
Security forces at African Barrick Gold's North Mara mine in Tanzania killed seven 
“criminal intruders” and injured a dozen more after 800 people stormed the project armed 
with machetes, rocks and hammers in a bid to steal gold ore […] a number of intruders 
sustained gunshot wounds, resulting in seven intruder fatalities and 12 injuries (Op. cit). 
  A most recent report of brutality by Canadian ABG/BGC security personnel against local 
community members ending in death was in March 2013. This incident which left 2 people dead 
was later reported to have been caused by the Tanzanian police force posted at ABG/BGC’s 
North Mara mine for security purposes.
114
  
North Mara Gold Mine: Shooting Incidents Year #Fatalities 
A man was fatally shot 11 Dec. 2008
115
 1 
A villager prospecting for gold at the Mine was shot dead 21 Jan. 2009 1 
Prospectors were killed 2 June 2009 2 
Prospectors were shot and injured by police at the Mine 2 June 2009 2 
Villagers shot and killed by police  8 July 2009 1 
Prospector was injured when a tear gas bomb exploded near him  28 Sept. 2009 1 
Prospector was shot in the back by police and died 15 Oct. 2009 1 
Four people were killed close to the Mine site by police 2 Feb. 2010 4 
Prospector was shot in the left leg by police at the Mine 15 March 2010 1 
Prospectors were shot by police while on the Mine site 9 May 2011 2 
Prospector was shot after police opened fire  14 May 2011 1 
Five people were shot dead and three others injured one Paralysed 16 May 2011 5 
Villager shot by police in the right side of his body and Paralysed 16 May 2011 1 
Prospector was shot and injured 14 July 2011 1 
Prospector was shot in the chest and killed. 7 May 2012 1 
Undisclosed number of people killed
116
  August 2014  
  
Even though the list above gives 25 incidents which have been confirmed by the police 
between 2008 and 2012, other records show that the number could be higher. In his article on the 
published in the Vice news April 19, 2014 issue, with the title “The Killing Continues at a 
                                                          
114
 Information accessed on June 18, 2014 at: http://www.facing-finance.org/database/cases/violence-at-north-mara-
goldminegewalt-und-vertreibung-bei-der-goldmine-in-north-mara/; and http://www.dailynews.co.tz/index.php/local-
news/15173-two-killed-in-mine-invasion  
115
 The rest of  information on this table were accessed at: 
http://www.miningwatch.ca/sites/www.miningwatch.ca/files/abg-a_pattern_of_abuse.pdf  
116
 Information accessed at: http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/international-business/deadly-
clashes-continue-at-african-barrick-gold-mine/article20216197/ 
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Canadian-Owned Mine In Tanzania”,  Chris Oke  taking recording narratives from villagers 
writes, “In the past three years [2010 – April 2014], 69 people have been killed by police at the 
North Mara Gold Mine”.117 The table below shows other incidences which have occurred in the 
areas Canadian MMCs Barrick Gold Corporation operate. 
Other Incidents at Barrick Owned Mine Sites in Tanzania 
Location Incident Year Impacts 
Bulyanhulu Eviction of artisanal miners from Bulyanhulu  1996 Loss of livelihood 
for approximately 
400,000 evicted 
artisanal miners 
North Mara Overflow of toxic sludge/Environmental pollution 2006
118
 Loss of livestock and 
Plants 
Overflow of toxic sludge/Environmental Pollution 2009
119
 Loss of livestock and 
health  hazards to 
community members 
14 women sexually assaulted by police and security 
guards at the mine. 
 
2013
120
 Physical and 
psychological 
trauma 
Buzwagi  Eviction of Artisanal miners from Buzwagi gold fields 2008
121
 Loss of livelihood 
for 600 evicted 
artisanal miners  
 
In contrast to the ‘change’ and ‘attractive-ness’ discourse that promoted the mineral-
based neoliberal capitalist economic system to the people of Tanzania (Lissu 2001; Chachage 
1995), mining activities in Tanzania have proved “inherently disruptive” (Kitula 2006: 405) to 
social, economic and ecological environments in Tanzania, as well as in other mineral rich 
countries in the global south. As seen in the above tables, the advent of multinational mining 
operations in Tanzania, especially the mining operations from the Canadian extractive industries, 
have not resulted in prosperity that was promised to the local community members by the 
Mkapa’s government.  
 
                                                          
117
 Information accessed at: https://news.vice.com/article/the-killing-continues-at-a-canadian-owned-mine-in-
tanzania  
118
 Information accessed at: http://www.ipsnews.net/2009/05/environment-tanzania-villagers-fearful-after-mine-
water-discharged-into-river/  
119
 Information accessed at: http://www.miningwatch.ca/fr/node/6356  
120
 Information accessed at: : http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/19/killings-uk-owned-gold-mine-
tanzania-concern 
121
 Information accessed at: http://www.protestbarrick.net/article.php?id=303  
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Environmental and Water Pollution: Impacts on Humans and Livestock 
Community members in the mining areas in Tanzania have been forced to live in a 
polluted
122
 environment and left to use water from contaminated sources. Incidences of toxic 
sludge flowing into water sources used by local community members and livestock living 
adjacent to the North Mara Gold Mine (NMGM) owned by the Canadian African Barrick Gold 
(ABG) - a subsidiary of Barrick Gold Corporation (BGC) have been widely reported. One recent 
incident of such toxic sludge spillage from the tailing pond, which was preceded by the initial 
spillage in 2005, was reported on May 9, 2009
123
. According to the reports related to this spill 
from ABG’s North Mara mine, 
“203 people became ill, 43 people 
died, and 1358 livestock died 
according to the Ward authorities in 
North Mara”.124 Reacting to the 
media reports, legislators in the 
Parliament of the United Republic 
of Tanzania called on the 
government to form a “probe team 
to investigate the matter in terms of 
effects, magnitude of the disaster 
and victims’ compensation”.125  
 
                                                          
122
 In his work, Kitula (2006) indicates the probable chances that environmental pollution found in the Northern gold 
belt of Tanzania hosting most of the MMCs could not be attributed to the current mineral exploitation regime (1995 
– 2014). His research findings conducted in Nyakabale village – Geita District elucidate facts that lead to the 
conclusion that, “most of Lake Victoria Gold Fields contain sulphide minerals associated with gold. After gold 
extraction, the decomposition of sulphide minerals releases acid waters in the form of acid mine drainage. Such 
drainage, which is now common in the old Geita Mine (mined before independence in 1960s), can contaminate 
nearby streams and ground water for centuries after a mine has closed. The formation of acid mine drainage is 
accelerated by high rainfall and high temperatures, reminiscent of the climate of Geita. The acids tend to leach 
heavy elements in tailings and mine waste dumps to produce toxic solutions which comprise heavy metals,” 
(Kahindi 2006: 410). Even though this research talks also about hazardous nature of cyanide and mercury use by 
both large and small scale miners, it does not, however, show comparative levels of environmental pollution as per 
large or small scale miners’ contribution. 
123
Reports on this incident are found at: http://barrick.live.radicaldesigns.org/article.php?id=499; 
http://barrick.live.radicaldesigns.org/article.php?id=500;  
124
 Information accessed on June 18, 2014 at: http://www.miningwatch.ca/fr/node/6356  
125
 Information accessed on June 18, 2014 at: http://barrick.live.radicaldesigns.org/article.php?id=502  
Figure 6: River Tigithe adjacent to the North Mara Gold Mine 
showing toxic sludge. Photo by Foundation HELP – Musoma 2009 
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A scientific study conducted in the areas around North Mara Gold Mine owned by 
ABG/BGC and Geita Gold Mine (GGM) owned by AngloGold Ashanti (AGA) reported levels of 
potentially life threatening arsenic in the North Mara and Geita respectively (Almas et al 
2009
126
). These injustices have been viewed differently by various non-State actors, including 
national and international CSOs, Faith Based Organisations (FBOs), research organisations, 
academics, political leaders and Tanzanian general public. They view such outcomes as 
attributive to the fact that “foreign [investors in Tanzania’s mining sector have been granted] too 
generous conditions when they were 
invited to invest in Tanzania in the 
early 1990s” (Lange & ESRF 2006: 
1). This undercuts the government’s 
ability to impose punitive measures to 
keep away the mineral curse ‘rhetoric’ 
from Tanzania’s mineral sector 
(Campbell ed 2004; Bourgouin 2011; 
Mjimba 2011; Mégret 2011; 
Szablowski 2007; Gordon 2010). This 
situation has rendered the Tanzanian 
government incapable of addressing 
the challenges faced by the people of 
Tanzania living in the mining areas. 
The table below shows some of the 
incidences that have taken place since 
the emergence of liberalisation 
policies in Tanzania.    
Apart from the media reports, the research commissioned by FBOs in Tanzania and 
jointly conducted by NULS/NMBU and UDSM (op. cit.) after investigating the area where the 
spillage occurred and repeating the tests for up to seven months in 2009, concluded that water 
                                                          
126
 Almas et al 2009: “Investigation of Trace Metal Concentrations in Soil, Sediments and Waters in the Vicinity of 
Gold Mines in North West Tanzania”; Published by the Norwegian University of Life Sciences. September 16, 2013 
at: http://www.miningwatch.ca/sites/www.miningwatch.ca/files/FinalTanzania_0.pdf 
Figure 7: Impacts of toxic water sludge in North Mara Gold Mine. 
Photo: ERubara 2010 
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and the environment around the spillage area: “…remains toxic for human consumption and 
grazing use [as the] concentration of arsenic around the tailing dam was from 111µg/l
127 
to 
1142µg/l. An area used for grazing by cattle contained 40 times the current WHO standard for 
safe drinking water of 10µg/l. A nearby area used for drinking water and deemed safe by the 
population contained 8µg/l of arsenic.
128
 
An excerpt from one of the daily newspapers in Tanzania reporting in June 2009 on the 
NMGM toxic sludge spillage read: 
VILLAGERS living near a gold mine owned and run by Canada’s Barrick Gold Corp. in 
Tarime District, Mara Region are demanding the immediate closure of the project, saying 
they are paying a deadly price for the mining activities in the area. Already, scores of 
people residing around Barrick’s North Mara Gold Mine are showing serious signs of 
exposure to pollution in the form of water contaminated with various chemicals allegedly 
flowing out of the mine and into the nearby River Tigithe. The villagers accuse the mine 
management, under the Canadian investor company, of causing fatal health hazards to 
human beings, livestock, and land in Kebasula Ward in Tarime, where the mine is 
located.
129
  
 
Figure 8: Location of African Barrick Gold's North Mara Gold Mine.  
Source: http://www.tanzaniagold.com/North_Mara.html 
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 Micrograms per litre 
128
 Information accessed on June 18, 2014 at: http://www.miningwatch.ca/fr/node/6356 
129
 Thisday Reporter “The Human Cost of Gold: And a Deadly Price to Pay”, June 27, 2009; Accessed on June 18, 
2014 at: http://www.jamiiforums.com/jukwaa-la-siasa/32349-the-human-cost-of-gold-and-a-deadly-price-to-
pay.html  
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Mineral Development Induced Displacements130 (MDIDs) 
Development induced displacements (DID) as a research topic have been dealt with in 
depth in Robinson (2003), Terminski (2013), and Cernea
131
 (1997) to name a few. Due to the 
broad nature of this subject, it will only be discussed in summary in this work as related to the 
MDID within the Tanzanian context. Worldwide assessment on DID showed that at the end of 
1996 about 80 – 90 million people were displaced by development projects; there was an 
increase of DID incidences by the end of 2006 (Robinson 2003). Involuntary displacements 
caused by development are viewed as “a worldwide problem [as well as] being borne 
disproportionately by the poorest and most marginalized populations” (Robinson 2003: 10).  
Documentary evidence suggests that mining activities “cannot be considered a consistent 
cause of development-induced displacement” (Terminski 2013: 60), yet it is also documented 
that MDID was responsible for “10.3% of development-induced displacement worldwide” (Op. 
cit. pg. 61). According to the current statistics on internal displacements recorded by the Internal 
Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), 52,369 people were displaced in Tanzania between 
2008 and 2012.
132
 These statistics do not specify whether or not such displacements are related to 
the MMCs operations in Tanzania. The best known statistical data on DID related incidents in 
Tanzania are connected to environmental conservation projects, an example being the 
displacements during the 1993 establishment of the Serengeti National Park, which expropriated 
land and facilitated involuntary displacement of up to “50,000 members of the Maasai tribe [as 
well as] the displacement of 10,000 indigenous people in connection with the creation of 
Mkomazi National Park” (Op. cit. pg. 67) in 2006. 
                                                          
130
 MDIDs is used here as to make a distinction between extractive industry induced displacements and other 
development induced displacements. Different sources considered, such as Robinson (2003), Terminski (2013) and 
Cenrea (1997) looks at displacement from a broader development perspective without specificity to displacement 
caused by mineral based development activities such as considered on this research. In the cited works and others 
not referenced on this research, terms such as ‘Development Induced Displacements’, ‘Environmentally Induced 
Displacements/migration’, ‘Conflict Induced Displacements/Migration’, etc. are widely in circulation in 
international development discourse circles. 
131
 Cenrea (1997) in his work titled “The Risks and Reconstruction Model for Resettling Displaced Populations” 
draws empirically proven perspectives that have led to his development of theoretical model of displacement, 
reconstruction and resettlement. This work which appeared in World Development Journal, Vol. 25, No. 10; and 
Published by Elsevier Science Ltd - Great Britain, was accessed on June 13, 2014 at: 
http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.library.yorku.ca/science/article/pii/S0305750X97000545  
132
 Information accessed on June 13, 2014 at: http://www.internal-displacement.org/global-figures/  
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Even though mining operations in Tanzania are reported to affect a number of 
community members in the mining areas, there seems to be a lack of proper statistical inventory 
to account for the number of community members in the mining areas who have been forced out 
of their homes to pave way for the MMCs operations. Available data on MDID scattered in 
reports by the CSOs are few in number.  Other reports on MDID incidents in Tanzania have 
reported the eviction of community members from Mtakuja village in Geita District paving the 
way for the expansion of Geita Gold Mine (GGM) operations.  
For example, a report by the interfaith committee in Tanzania documents the 
displacement of 86 family units comprising over 250 evictees (Mining for Life 2008
133
). This 
incident has also received significant reporting from other news agencies such as the Integrated 
Regional Information Networks (IRIN)
134
 (2013).  A report on human rights and business issued 
by the Legal and Human Rights Centre (LHRC) Tanzania places the number of the Mtakuja 
evictees at 85 (LHRC: 2013). A research conducted by Kitula (2006)  findings report that “some 
1800 villagers were forcibly displaced in Mtakuja, Nyamalembo and Nyamange villages in 
Mtakuja Ward, following the establishment of the Geita Gold Mine” (Kitula 2006: 411).  
MDIDs are difficult to avoid given the open pit mining projects common in Tanzania. 
Inherently, open pit mining projects displace huge numbers of rural community members in the 
mining areas as such project requires a lot of land. It requires land for its plant and the mining 
site; it requires land space for waste rock disposal as well as land for its personnel. This being the 
nature of open pit mining, displacement of local community members is inevitable. Such 
displacements present a number of implications for the evictees at the individual, household and 
communal level - a total change in a community’s associational life.  
The findings of the research conducted by Kitula (2006) in Geita District, especially 
among community members in the mining localities drew a conclusion that at least “47.3% to 
67.6% [people] in mining and non-mining communities […] were engaged in agriculture” (Op. 
cit. pg. 407). As Kitula documents, apart from displacements of the local community members, 
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 “Mining for Life: A Fact Finding Mission by Religious Leaders in Mining Areas” (Interfaith Committee 2008). 
Accessed on June 18, 2014 at: http://afrikayetu.net/2014/06/18/mining-for-life-a-fact-finding-mission-by-religious-
leaders-in-mining-areas/  
134
 “Tanzanian farmers displaced by mining live like refugees”: Zahra Moloo, 3 June 2013 IRIN; Accessed on June 
18, 2014 at: http://www.irinnews.org/report/98150/tanzanian-farmers-displaced-by-mining-live-like-refugees  
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there were cases of “unemployment, child labour, accidents […] prostitution, increased 
incidences of banditry, changes to indigenous lifestyle” (Kitula 2006: 410).  
 
Figure 9: An Abandoned Court house provided by the Geita District Administration to accommodate over 250 
evictees from Mtakuja Village. Photo by ERubara (2007) 
 
Challenges of Relocation and Compensation in the Tanzanian Context  
Documentary reviews on the impacts of MMCs operations on the experiences of local 
community members also draw attention to the losses of land and livelihood. This issue is 
closely connected to MDID incidences. Related but not peculiar to the Canadian MMCs 
operation areas in Tanzania, compensation losses have been identified as one of the perpetual 
challenges faced in the land tenure ‘negotiations’ between mining MMCs and the local 
community members. In addition to ‘heated’ discussions in the Parliament of the United 
Republic of Tanzania (PURT), ranging from the MDAs to the establishment of security 
infrastructures in potential mineral development areas (HS-12-41-2008 #360), the issue of 
compensation was described by the Kahama MP James Lembeli, as a persistently ‘nagging’ 
problem. 
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Figure 10: One of the resettlement residential units constructed by Pangea Minerals Limited in Buzwagi.  
Photo: ERubara 2010 
 
Compensation challenges were identified at the Canadian ABG/BGC mining operations 
in Buzwagi, pitting local communities displaced from their ancestral land areas and homes to 
pave way for the operations of ABG Buzwagi Gold Mine in north-western Tanzania against 
ABG. “Disagreement about the differences on compensation rates” (HS-12-3-2008/#26: 13) was 
identified to be the main cause of discord. According to the Parliamentary Hansards, the 
compensation process began as early as 2005. Property evaluation for compensation due to 
displacement of local community members from ancestral land was conducted in Mwime, 
Mwendakulima and Chapulwa villages. The Hansards show that “205 houses were compensated 
as well as an agreement to construct 207 ‘modern’ housing units along with monetary 
compensation amounting to Tzs. 200,000 for each of the artisanal mining shafts” (HS-12-3-
2008/#26: 13).  
Even though the compensation records as per the Tanzanian parliament from MEM show 
only 205 cases requiring compensation in 2008, the number cited by the MP for Kahama was 
higher by 335 compensation and relocation cases. It appears from the Parliamentary records that 
there were at the time 540 households evicted from the Buzwagi Gold Mine area “awaiting to get 
redress from the government” (HS-12-3-2008/#26: 14) on their compensation and relocation 
disputes with ABG/BGC Buzwagi mine management. However, further discussions in the PURT 
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about compensation matters in relation to these displaced community members seem to have 
been stalled by ‘protocol’ challenges on the part of the government of Tanzania in fulfilling its 
promise to deal with these compensation and relocation challenges (HS-10-5-2008/#121). 
The construction of the 207 residential units by Pangea Minerals Limited
135
 which started 
officially in 2007 was completed and the housing units were open for community members a 
year after as seen on Figure 8 above. However members of the community who were allocated 
the residential units seem not to be satisfied with the quality of the housing units. There have 
been complaints. Such complaints were that the units are small and not able to accommodate 
even a household of 4. Empirical evidence and from my experience working with the displaced 
community members in Buzwagi shows that the most complaints regarding the sizes of the 
residential units provided by ABG/BGC  came from large and Polygamous
136
 households as they 
could not fit in the provided resettlement units.  
 
Figure 11: Location of African Barrick's Buzwagi Gold Mine. Source: 
http://www.infomine.com/index/properties/Buzwagi.html 
Mineral-based Economics and Rural-Urban Migration Trends in Tanzania 
Another issue of concern is the fleeting rural life attachment among the younger 
generation, which was vibrant before the mid-1990s. Farming has become largely useless to 
many of the youthful members of society. While this cannot be said to be the case in all local 
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 Pangea Minerals Limited is a subsidiary of African Barrick Gold. It operates ABG’s Buzwagi Gold Mine.  
136
 In an African setting, especially in polygamous families, each wife had her own house. According to the 
community members I interacted with over the housing issue in Buzwagi, both men and women said that “the 
government has left them in the hands of foreigners who have no respect to the African cultural values.” 
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communities in Tanzania, It is certainly the case among local communities living in the mining 
areas. This seeming desertion, even detestation of traditional rural life, can by no means be only 
attributed to climate change trends, which have contributed to the migration of rural populace, 
including those from the mining areas into urban areas (Bryceson et al 2012; EU 2013: 2).  
Among the challenges faced by local community members living in the mining areas 
since the inception of MMCs operations in Tanzania is the widening of the poverty margin. 
Whether out of fear of destitution due to lack of land for farming or uncertainty in getting proper 
jobs in the MMCs hosted in their communities, most rural dwellers including those with 
minimum or no trade skills are now moving to the main urban centres.  
The 2012 census results, as shown in Figure 10 below, confirm the rural-urban migration 
trends. Dar es Salaam alone is currently – in the year 2014, a home to about 4,364,541 
inhabitants as shown in Figure 10 below. An employment survey conducted by Global Post 
reveals that “out of over 1,000 young people across Tanzania, only 14 percent reported working 
a formal, wage-earning job [and that] each year, 900,000 young Tanzanians enter a job market 
that is generating only 50,000 to 60,000 new jobs”.137  
Another report compiled by the European Union looking at ‘city dynamics and growth 
rates’ places the Tanzanian urban population to be at least 10 – 12 million inhabitants and a 
growth rate of 35%, similar to Cameroon and Ghana (EU 2013). The report states further that 
such “similarities are attributable to historically differing social, economic and political 
processes in each of the countries” (EU 2013: 3). Yet another report provides a comparative view 
on urbanisation growth, which establishes an annual urban population growth of up to 29.1% in 
2012 as compared to 5.7% in 1967 (Smitha 2014). A detailed urban statistical outlook attempts 
to elucidate rural-urban population migration dynamics. Migration patterns from rural to urban 
areas could be suggested as one of the direct impacts of the MMCs’ operations in rural 
Tanzania.
138
 It does not take a long time even for a visitor in Dar es Salaam to realise that the 
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 Jacob Kushner 2013: Global Post Rights “Tanzania’s Perplexing Youth Unemployment Crisis”; GP, October 29, 
2013; Accessed on June 18, 2014 at: http://www.globalpost.com/dispatches/globalpost-blogs/rights/tanzania-youth-
unemployment-crisis  
138
 Proper investigation need to be carried out to identify rural-urban migration patterns from and to the mining 
areas. Until now, statistical evidences of the influx of rural-urban – unskilled migration to Dar es Salaam are 
countrywide. 
80 | P a g e :  E R u b a r a _ M E S :  M R P _ C o - O p t e d .  © 2 0 1 4  
 
majority are travelling from the rural areas to urban areas such as Dar es Salaam in pursuit of a 
job. Any job.   
Tanzania 1967 
Census 
1978 
Census 
1988 
Census 
2002 
Census 
2012 
Census 
Mainland Urban Population  
(Growth rate % p.a.)  
- of which: Dar es Salaam  
(Growth rate % p.a.)  
685,092  
 
272,821  
2,257,921  
(11.5%)  
769,445  
(9.9%)  
3,999,882  
(5.9%)  
1,205,443  
(4.6%)  
7,554,838  
(4.7%)  
2,336,055  
(4.8%)  
12,701,238  
(5.3%)  
4,364,541  
(6.5%)  
 
Mainland Total Population  
(Growth rate % p.a.)  
 
11,975,757  
 
17,036,499  
(3.3%)  
 
22,507,047  
(2.8%)  
 
33,461,849 
(2.9%)  
 
43,625,354  
(2.7%)  
Urbanisation (%)  5.7  13.3  17.8  22.6  29.1  
Figure 12: A Comprehensive table showing growth rate in the administrative capital Dar Es Salaam and general 
growth rate in Tanzania mainland. Adapted from the IGC (2014)
139 
Political Competition and Social Services 
Various research reports on compensation and relocation matters attribute delays in 
paying compensation to displaced community members to two main causes: political gain and 
graft. Lange & ESRF (2006) cite accusations of favouritism made against political leaders as the 
practice of diverting local development project funds for one area to local areas where they have 
personal interests. In the same report, a local leader is quoted as follows: 
…the process of agreeing upon a project is very cumbersome, since both the members of 
parliament and the councillors are eager to see projects implemented in their own 
constituency (Op. cit. pg. 20). 
 A research conducted by the Legal and Human rights Centre (LHRC) suggests that, 
compensation process is characterised by corrupt practices as well (LHRC 2013). Even though 
the LHRC report primarily concerns human rights and business for the year 2013, it captures the 
lack of accountability of government officials in Tanzania in handling compensation processes 
for poor Tanzanians in the mining areas.  
                                                          
139
 Accessed on June 18, 2014 at: http://www.theigc.org/sites/default/files/Urbanisation%20in%20Tanzania%20-
%20Final.pdf 
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In conclusion, weaknesses within the Tanzanian governance structures demonstrate the 
need for political and economic responsibility to citizens. Parliamentary discourses on issues 
related to the welfare and redress of local community complaints against the MMCs have been 
countered by indifference by the neoliberal government in Tanzania. Colonial structures and 
neoliberal system combined seem to make it difficult for the State actors in Tanzania to attend to 
the needs of the people of Tanzania. The situation even worsens when cultural structures are 
revisited. But with the choice of three different leadership and governance structures, the 
Tanzanian government must make a choice. It must choose which structure will be suitable in 
addressing the challenges faced by its citizenry.  
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Chapter 6 
Conclusion and Discussion: Co-Opted? Challenges of 
Synthesised Governance Structures in Tanzania 
 
[While] a successful and a failed state in Africa [depends] on the political and accumulation strategies 
of contemporary political and economic actors […]political and social maladies that bedevil many 
African states are but traditional in nature. 
(Samatar 1997: 687) 
 
By way of exploration, the analyses of this research have attempted to explain historical 
political, economic and social factors that have led to potential ineffectiveness of leadership and 
governance structures in Tanzania. Through the pages of this research, it is evident that with 
leadership and governance structures modelled after colonial structures, it is impossible for 
postcolonial States such as Tanzania to prioritise the interests of its citizens through proper 
management and equitable distribution of revenues from the exploitation of their natural/mineral 
resource.  
Rooted in the perspective of the classical, structural Marxist schools of thought and 
African cultural associational practices, this paper has sought to emphasise that mineral-based 
sociopolitical and economic relationship between the Tanzanian and Canadian governments are 
largely exploitative and imperialistic. This imperialist regime adopted by the Canadian MMCs to 
their benefit, was built upon existing African leadership and governance structures which were 
adapted under the colonial regime. With this traditional and colonially adapted leadership and 
governance foundation already in place, Canadian MMCs are at an advantageous position.  
Both classical and neo-Marxists such as Marx & Engels (1848/1968) and Miliband 
(1969) have explained why the Tanzanian state actors may be used as tools by the elite capitalist 
society to further the capitalist society’s economic agendas. Neo-Marxist theorists such as 
Rodney (1981) and Fanon (2004) suggest that such attitude found within the Tanzanian State 
comes from its actors being mentally, morally and politically ‘sanitised’ from any sense of 
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accountability to its own citizenry through colonising education and by the fact that the initial 
economic system developed outside their domain. In fact, those who could be described as 
neoliberal capitalist political and economic system critics such as Mbembe (1992/2001), Samatar 
(1997) and Berman (1998) would propose that governance structures in Tanzania are imported. 
From this view, those in the leadership and decision making positions are being used by the 
Canadian MMCs as a person would use a robot. This research finds such a suggestion too 
general and restrictive of the other factors that must be considered when theorising leadership 
and governance structures in Tanzania, as well as other African nation-states.  
Irrespective of the fact that Tanzania’s past political and economic policies from 1967 – 
1985 sparked a considerable negative reaction from the international community (Tripp 2012) 
and especially from the Bank and the Fund, the preparations for introducing the neoliberal 
policies in Tanzania started in 1986 shortly after Mwalimu Nyerere stepped down from power.  
The establishment of the neoliberal economic system in Tanzania in 1995 by Mkapa’s 
administration opened a new sociopolitical and economic dispensation. This ‘new’ era was, at 
the very beginning, characterised by partisan politics. In this scenario, most economic decisions 
that were made were politically inclined. With the echoes of democratising political discourse 
gaining momentum across Africa, the ruling party – CCM, took a strategic position “given their 
reading of the political tea leaves […] to stay ahead of the game [and] enhance [their] credibility 
over that of the opposition” (Tripp 2012: 1). In doing so, most critical sociopolitical and 
economic discussions were carried out within party boundaries guided by the principle of 
seeking to establish an affluent party whose policies would be accepted by the international trade 
and investment community (Tripp 2012). 
Clearly, the Tanzanian government as seen throughout this research, especially in chapter 
1 and 2, is espoused to the residual colonial structures. This happened after the demise of the 
Ujamaa policies. This research has also identified nepotism to be among the factors that lead to 
the state of apathy within the Tanzanian government. The epoch of self-centred political careers 
and political vocations which are based not on patriotism but has as its benchmark, nepotistic 
trends. This produces leadership and governance structured which are built not on true 
stateswo/manship but on networks of self-gratification and favouritism. This is where kinship, 
household, ethnic and partisan politicking comes.    
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From the Tanzanian context, and as a country which has ratified almost all conventions 
related to trade and environment, we are presented with a case of “extremely complex and 
convoluted networks of power relationships [and] overlapping legal conventions” (Death 2012: 
15) to which the Tanzanian governing authorities must comply. Globalising sociopolitical, 
economic and environmental discourse has not only taken the rights of sovereign states to 
formulate policies that protect the citizenry, the economy and the environment within their 
political territories; it has also allowed high levels of social and environmental recklessness in 
the Global South by affluent countries from the Global North through its MMCs operations.  
Mining Communities, Conflicts and Redress 
Mining activities are inherently disruptive (Kitula 2006), especially in a country like 
Tanzania where almost all mining operations are open pit. This industry has inherent social, 
economic and environmental impacts which affect local community members in such mining 
areas directly. The need for vast tracts of land may be higher than during the colonial period as 
mining companies have increased in number. Overall, large scale mining operations are a source 
of conflict, claiming ancestral land from community members (Newenham-Kahindi 2010; Butler 
2014), leading to the alteration of local community members’ associational life by forcing the 
displacement of local community members, and introducing health hazards within the local 
environments as well as economic differentiation (Kitula 2006; Carstens & Hilson 2009; Guesnet 
& Müller eds. 2014; Butler 2014; Newenham-Kahindi 2010). 
In an attempt to explore the roots of such conflicts between community members and 
foreign investors such as African Barrick Gold (ABG), various views have been presented. One 
of the immediate causes of such conflicts has been highlighted as the expropriation of land 
(Kitula 2006; Carstens & Hilson 2009). Although land remains a major contributor, it cannot be 
proved that land is the main problem. Experiences from working with local community members 
show that community members in the mining areas in Tanzania were ready to move from their 
ancestral lands as long as government authorities and the investors were ready to provide another 
resettlement area furnished with the social utilities that would meet their needs. It should be 
noted that in all the eviction records highlighted in the discussion above, there is no single 
community in Tanzania evicted from their ancestral land that resisted at first. Rather, community 
members who were evicted from Bulyanhulu complained about both the short and conflicting 
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notice they were given by the government to move from the KMCL area without an alternative 
place where they could start life (Lissu 2001; Kerr & Holloway 2002). Many of these community 
members are still waiting for the government to fulfil its promise for compensation and provision 
of resettlement areas. 
The main cause of conflicts reported in the mining areas in Tanzania is lack of 
employment. Historically, this is not a problem peculiar to the neoliberal mining regimes. 
Closely related to lack of equity in employment opportunity is the whole issue of education and 
skills to be able to be able to get non-farming jobs (AU & ECA 2011; Carstens & Hilson 2009; 
Roberts 1986). Local community members have been, as it were, caught unaware by mining 
projects and they have insufficient to no knowledge in terms of how to integrate into the sector 
as a primary source for their livelihood. Lack of skilled human resources in Tanzania in relation 
to the opportunities that are available in the mining sector is still a widespread problem 
(AU/ECA 2011) 
Conflicts in the mining areas arise from the lack of Social License to Operate (SLO), as 
well as the lack of Free and Prior Informed Consent (FPIC). These two concepts, even though 
they appear to have essentially the same meaning, nevertheless present two different 
perspectives. SLO as defined by Pike (2012) “consists of both the acquisition and on-going 
maintenance of the consent of the local stakeholders” (Op. cit. pg. 3) on the one hand, and 
FPIC
140
 refers to the local community’s inclusive, knowledge-based decision-making processes 
before the mining operations commence and “is invoked in decisions that affect indigenous land, 
livelihoods, culture, or resources” (Szablowski 2011: 111). Even though SLO and FPIC could be 
useful when put to work, they remain weak and ineffective in a country like Tanzania where land 
is vested in the Republic and all decisions on matters related to land are made by the Head of 
State. Indigenous land rights are therefore not effective. However, lack of both SLO and FPIC 
could be said to be one of the major reasons besides expropriation of land which causes conflicts 
in the mining areas.  
                                                          
140
 Even though FPIC is meant to promote a sense of partnership between the primary land owners and protectors – 
the community members, it is viewed with suspicion and resentment by the governing authorities. It is shrouded 
with contention “because of its implications for state sovereignty and control over natural resource development”, 
(Szablowski 2011: 114) 
86 | P a g e :  E R u b a r a _ M E S :  M R P _ C o - O p t e d .  © 2 0 1 4  
 
Another contributing factor to the grievances ending in fatal confrontations between 
community members and Canadian MMCs’ operators, is that of being indifferent to the people. 
This not only fosters a sense of insecurity among the local community members, but also acts as 
a catalyst for companies to claim irresponsibility in case of a fatal accident, deliberate killings or 
other fatalities related to any such mining operations. This could explain why the government of 
Tanzania is has not properly reprimanded ABG/BGC on reports of acts of lawlessness both in 
terms of brutality and destroying the environments around their areas of operation. Conflicts 
confronting Canadian MMCs in Tanzania are therefore a product of multifaceted causalities. On 
the one hand is the factor of estranged relationship between ABG and the local community 
members, and on the other is the sense of community members being abandoned by their own 
government into the merciless hands of a foreign investment entity.  
Looking at the key conflicts identified in the mining sector in Tanzania, it is not clear 
from the different documents examined why the relations between ABG/BGC and the local 
communities have not been resolved. In normal cases in the face of conflicts and even resistance, 
it would be expected of the management of the mine site operators to slow the planned 
implementation of such multimillion dollar mineral projects and revise initial investment 
strategies to address the needs and concerns of the local community members. But this is not so 
when it comes to the operations of Canadian ABG/BGC. According to Gordon (2010) 
“resistance does not deter Canada from its global mission of free market fundamentalism, 
[instead] it simply inspires its capacity to engage in violence” (Op. cit. pg. 12).  This it achieves 
through the operations of its MMCs, such as Barrick Gold Corporation, operating in conflict-
ridden goldfields in Tanzania. What is even more ‘interesting’ is how inconsequential the lives 
of local community members are to ABG/BGC as compared to gold. 
On the part of the government of Tanzania, a number of theories could be employed to 
explain its seeming apathy towards cases of brutality. From a Marxist point of view, it would be 
argued that the government of Tanzania has been influenced by the neoliberal capitalist 
discourse to an extent that all it could do is to comply with the latter’s commands. Compatible 
with strategies used for foreign aid, the governing class in Tanzania have used such relationships 
to create or buy political loyalty and in the process “ignore their citizens needs altogether” (Tripp 
2012: 30). Indeed, such preferential economic strategy (LHRC 2013), especially between 
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Canada, Canadian MMCs and the Tanzanian government, leads the community members in the 
Tanzanian mining areas to even greater depths of despondency and a sense of abandonment by 
their government. 
Due to the litany of both social and environmental injustices in the mining areas in 
Tanzania and the state of apathy evidenced by the government for its citizens, there has been an 
increase in number of local and international non-government actors working with local 
community members on equity, participation, and distributive justice issues. The civil society 
organisations (CSOs) have played the mediation role between the local community members and 
the government as well as the investor community in the mining areas. They have also been 
perceived as showing partiality in handling human rights violations by the multinational mining 
companies in the Tanzanian mineral rich rural areas, especially those operated by Canadian 
MMCs. Even though this is not a bad thing in itself, it nevertheless suggests a discursive 
platform with high possibilities to allow those with “influence over governance, including 
government, industry, finance and [even CSOs]” (Op. cit. pg. 28) to easily assert their demands 
over those proposed by less affluent parties. However, this should not be understood as 
underestimating positive contributions made by selected key players within the CSO platform in 
Tanzania in highlighting the plight of local community members in Tanzania.  
In its efforts to establish structures to “increase transparency and accountability in the 
national extractive industries”, (URT 2008: 1141) the government of Tanzania through the 
Ministry of Energy and Minerals (MEM) joined the Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiatives (EITI). This began the process which led to the establishment of Tanzania Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiatives (TEITI). Even though this initiative was established to 
increase transparency, TEITI’s first validation report reveals that members of the Multi-
Stakeholder Group (MSG) raised transparency related concerns as “certain inclusions were 
deemed questionable” (TEITI 2011: 11). At its initial stage and to ensure that transparency 
initiatives in Tanzania were recognised, the MSG proposed the inclusion of the TEITI mandate 
in the Mining Act 2010 to the Legislative Assembly but was ignored (TEITI 2011). It later 
became evident that the Mining Act 2010, has a “prohibition (clause) against the disclosure of 
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 Press Release: Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the Government and [Tanzania Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiatives] TEITI-Multi-Stakeholder Working Group, of November 18, 2008.  
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information” (URT 2010: 25) in Section 25. The TEITI process has proved effective in 
highlighting ‘misplaced’ or unaccounted for expenditure and in their third payments 
reconciliation reported “a net difference of Tzs. 11 billion […] unresolved” [government 
payments which] represents 2.21% of the total reported government receipts” (TEITI 2013: 5).  
Besides such payments unaccounted for, the report also points to Canadian AGB/BGC 
operations in Bulyanhulu and North Mara “not paying corporation taxes though they are making 
profits” (TEITI 2013: 5). The reason given for this continued lack of corporation tax payments is 
their continued declaration of “significant unutilised tax losses from previous years of USD 1.3 
Billion as of 31 December 2011 (2010 USD 1.5 Billion” (TEITI 2013: 5). Additionally, recent 
media reports have highlighted a bribery incident at ABG/BGC in North Mara’s operations. 
According to Wall Street Journal, June 18, 2014 issue, ABG/BGC is cited to have “…paid more 
than $400,000 in cash mostly to Tanzanian government officials and consultants responsible for 
valuing the land, according to company invoices and copies of checks reviewed”.142  Even 
though TEITI was established by the government of the United Republic of Tanzania to 
highlight such malpractices, it is surprising that the government of Tanzania is still failing to take 
proper measures to ensure that tax evasions and bribery reports are dealt with.  
The State of ‘Indifference’ and Tanzania’s Mining Sector 
Tanzania opened up its natural resource and mineral reserves for exploitation by the 
global north countries. The global north employed the development discourse and the 
‘knowledge/capacity deficit discourse’ to access the most coveted resource in the global south 
countries. In his address to the Africa Gem Resources (AFGEM) gathering, Benjamin Mkapa
143
 
is quoted as follows: “I invite you to Tanzania. Let us forge a profitable and smart partnership – 
we, in Tanzania with our mineral resources
144
 and you, with your capital, technology, knowhow 
and managerial skills”145 (Benjamin Mkapa in Lange & ESRF 2006: 1) 
                                                          
142
 “Barrick Gold Unit Is Accused of Bribery in Africa”: Mining Firm Doles Out $400,000 in Cash to Officials, 
Others; Company Says Payments Are Legitimate; Rachel Louise Ensign and Christopher M. Matthews; June 18, 
2014 Wall Street Journal – Business; Accessed at: http://online.wsj.com/articles/barrick-gold-unit-is-accused-of-
bribery-in-africa-1403134228  
143
 Benjamin Mkapa was the third phase head of State in Tanzania. 
144
 Italics and formatting mine 
145
 Italics and formatting mine 
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Mkapa’s address assumed that Tanzania’s economic woes could be addressed if the 
country’s resources were used to reach a better economic position not just for the government 
but for the people of Tanzania as well (Gausnet & Frank in Guesnet & Müller eds. 2014: 5) In 
contrast to the Ujamaa, policies which envisioned a Tanzanian economy supported by communal 
efforts of empowered citizenry (Spalding 1996), the neoliberal capital system in Tanzania 
proposed laying out the nation’s natural resources, especially the mineral resources, in exchange 
for “capital, technology, know-how and managerial skills” (op. cit.).  
Value and Contribution of the Major Paper 
Several social justice movement groups in Tanzania, including the civil society 
organisations (CSOs) hold the belief that underdevelopment among Tanzanians results from lack 
of skilled expertise and lack of deliberate strategies by the government to empower its citizenry. 
The CSOs have therefore embarked on capacity building and empowerment programmes. Even 
though a lot has improved and rural community dwellers get more chances to learn, capacity 
building strategies still revolve around programme officers and other already empowered people. 
Empowerment for personnel from the CSOs is done to enable effectiveness of fund management 
as well as help partners in proposal writing, documentation etc. Just as the government of 
Tanzania harbours nepotism and colonial structures, so could be said of the CSOs. Nepotism and 
politics of favouritism are on the rise.  
The lack of capacity, i.e. in mineral resource management specific skills, and human 
resource capacity has been sold wholesale to and within the Tanzanian civil society since the 
introduction of the development discourse in the 1990s. As a result, most civil society 
organisations fail to identify and attract knowledge-based capacities among the local populace. 
Instead, civil society in Tanzania seeks ‘foreign’ expertise thus furthering dependency on 
outsiders in cleaning up social, economic and environmental problems that could be best handled 
by locals who understand the context better. Experientially, some of these demands are imposed 
on local civil society by donor organisations from the Global North. The organisations who fail 
to comply run the risk of not receiving any funding for such projects which seeks to address 
inequity. This attitude, besides perpetuating colonial mentality by way of material imposition, 
creates negative and enslaving divisiveness between actors within the global civil society 
fighting against illiteracy, diseases and poverty.  Yet, there has not been deliberate resistance and 
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efforts within the CSOs, among academic experts and expert researchers in Tanzania, in Africa 
as well as other countries beyond the African continent to demand, claim and promote equality 
within the expert knowledge on mining specific leadership, governance and technical skills.  
From the findings of this research it is clear that similar to some misguided intentions 
during liberation calls in Africa in the 1950s, so are some of such misguided intentions seeking 
to address leadership and governance issues in Africa today. Corruption has been highlighted as 
one of the contributing factors to the state of abject poverty in Tanzania besides lack of capacity. 
But nepotism, even though it does not attract as much attention as lack of capacity and 
corruption, proves to be the biggest challenge within leadership and governance structures in 
Tanzania. Nepotism, as seen in this research can be exercised at different levels, that is to say, 
culturally, politically and professionally at both national (local context) and international levels. 
Practices of nepotism have therefore not only been useful in enriching a small percentage of the 
Tanzanian population but could be described as the obvious yet ignored enemy.   
And despite Tanzania’s known extensive natural/mineral resource wealth, the average 
income of Tanzanian citizens remains very low. Tanzania still faces high levels of early deaths, 
lack of basic social services and deepening poverty levels in rural areas including the mineral-
rich areas. This situation indicates how important it is for a far greater proportion of the mineral 
wealth to be invested in social and economic infrastructure that would improve the living 
standards of the Tanzanian people, beginning with the local communities in the mining areas.  
The Tanzanian government suffers from lack of a clear political framework upon which 
to develop by fostering the mineral deposits within its political territory for the benefit of the 
people of Tanzania. The residual colonial structural economic foundations were never dealt with 
at independence and are still a challenge 50 years after Tanzania’s independence. Traditional 
pathways on leadership and governance have long been abandoned. Highly learned Tanzanians, 
learned Tanzanians and those who still struggle to define their future turn their faces ashamedly 
from traditional pathways.  Progressive politicians as well as academics and people of different 
expertise are silenced as the government of the day embraces neoliberal capitalist market-led 
economic system.  In embracing the neoliberal capitalist market-led economic system, the 
Tanzanian government services the old system as the wood in Ayi Kwei Armah (1968). Ayi 
Kwei Armah in his book “The Beautyful Ones Are Not Yet Born” says: 
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What had been going on there and was going on now and would go on and on through all 
the years was a species of war carried on in the silence of long ages, a struggle in which 
only the keen, uncanny eyes and ears of lunatic seers could detect the deceiving, easy 
breathing of the struggles. The wood within would win and win till the end of time. Of 
that there was no doubt possible, only the pain of hope perennially doomed to 
disappointment. It was so clear. Of course it was in the nature of wood to rot with age. 
The polish, it was supposed, would catch the rot. But of course in the end it was the rot 
which imprisoned everything in its effortless embrace. It did not really have to fight. 
Being was enough. In the natural course of things it would always take the newness of 
the different kinds of polish and the vaunted cleansing power of the chemicals in them, 
and it would convert all to victorious filth, awaiting yet more polish again and again and 
again. And the wood was not alone. Apart from the wood itself there were, of course, 
people themselves, just so many hands and fingers bringing help to the wood in its course 
towards putrefaction. Left-hand fingers in their careless journey from a hasty anus sliding 
all the way up the banister as their owners made the return trip from the lavatory 
downstairs to the offices above. Right-hand fingers still dripping with the after-piss and 
the stale sweat from fat crotches. The calloused palms of messengers after they had 
blown their clogged noses reaching for a convenient place to leave the well-rubbed 
moisture. Afternoon hands not entirely licked clean of palm soup and remnants of 
kenkey
146
. The wood would always win (Armah 1998: 12, 13).  
 
 
 
  
                                                          
146
 Italics original. Kenkey is a staple dish of West Africa traditionally made with Maize meal or Cassava.  
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